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COMMENT
Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to
an Adequate Education
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education."'
"There are greater, more certain and more immediate penalties
in this country for serving up a single rotten hamburger than for
furnishing a thousand schoolchildren with a rotten education. '2
"If every failed student could seek ... damages against any
teacher, administrator and school he feels may have shortchanged
him at some point in his education, the courts could be deluged and
schools shut down."3
INTRODUCION
For the last quarter century, American courts have steadfastly
refused to hold teachers and school systems liable for failing to
educate individual students.4 Despite widespread concern about the
quality of education offered in the nation's public schools, 5 state
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
2. William Bennett, former U.S. Secretary of Education, quoted in John N. Maclean,
Indiana Makes Book on Theory of Education Reform, Ci. TRIB., Oct. 4,1987, § 4, at 1.
3. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
4. See, e.g., Sellers v. School Bd., 960 F. Supp. 1006, 1012-14 (E.D. Va. 1997); Ross,
740 F. Supp. at 1332; Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Donohue v. Copiague Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y.
1979).
5. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE iN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK:
THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983) (warning of a "rising tide of
mediocrity" in public schools); Jonathan Kozol, Illiteracy Statistics: A Numbers Game,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1986, at A31 (discussing the results of a study indicating that 10
million American adults are illiterate and 36 million cannot read at an eighth-grade level);
Tamar Lewin, Schools Taking Tougher Stance with Standards: New Emphasis on Tests,
and New Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1999, at Al (reporting a "harsher atmosphere" in
the 1999-2000 academic year as states use standardized tests, school report cards, and
teacher pay penalties to increase accountability); Quality Counts: State of the States,
EDUC. WK., Jan. 7, 1999, available at <http:lwww.edweek.orglsreportslqc99/exsum.htm>
(providing state report cards on school reform efforts such as standardized testing
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courts have refused to hear so-called "educational malpractice"
claims brought against local schools.6 In rejecting these claims, state
judges have said they are not sure how to evaluate teachers'
performance when there is no public or professional consensus about
what works in the classroom.7 Even in relatively clear-cut cases,8 they
have refused to grant relief for fear of entanglement in daily school
operations and a flood of lawsuits by disgruntled parentsf
Yet even as judges have barred the courtroom doors to
individual educational malpractice claims, they have begun to hold
public schools accountable for providing an adequate education on a
statewide level. In the last thirty years, litigants have filed
constitutional challenges to public school financing in more than forty
states.10 Despite concerns about separation of powers and the lack of
judicially manageable standards, most courts have agreed to hear
programs and state takeovers of failing schools); Rene Sanchez, U.S. High School Seniors
Rank Near Bottom: Europeans Score Higher in Math, Science Test, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,
1998, at Al (reporting that American students ranked close to last among 21 nations
participating in a rigorous new math and science exam).
6. See, e.g., Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 855; Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353. Although
most cases have focused on negligence and malpractice theories, families also have
pursued claims based on breach of contract, see Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc., 793
S.W.2d 832, 833 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990), and negligent misrepresentation, see Peter W., 131
Cal. Rptr. at 862-63. Only one state court has suggested that a claim for educational
malpractice is a viable cause of action, and that opinion has been seriously undermined by
more recent cases. See B.M. v. State ("B.M. II"), 698 P.2d 399, 401 (Mont. 1985); B.M. v.
State ("B.M. I"), 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982) (plurality opinion); infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860 ("Unlike the activity of the highway or the
marketplace, classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or
cause, or injury.").
8. Courts have not only banned claims for general failures to educate, but also for
blatant errors in diagnosing disabilities and placing students in appropriate classroom
settings. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 318-19 (N.Y. 1979)
(rejecting a claim by a speech-impaired student who was misdiagnosed and placed in
classes for students with mental handicaps for 13 years); see also D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N.
Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 554 (Alaska 1981) (rejecting a claim based on a
failure to diagnose learning disabilities and to provide an appropriate education program
upon discovery); Doe v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814, 814-15 (Md. 1982) (rejecting a
claim based on a misdiagnosis of learning disabilities).
9. See, e.g., Hoffman, 400 N.E.2d at 320 (predicting that recognition of educational
malpractice claims would force courts to examine "each of the procedures used in the
education of every student in our school system").
10. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behin& New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101, 185-94 (1995) (summarizing cases through 1995); infra
note 22 (citing cases through 1999).
11. See, e.g., Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So.
2d 400, 406-08 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam) (expressing concerns about usurping the Florida
legislature's responsibility for education and the lack of manageable standards in
evaluating education); Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill.
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school financing cases, and a growing number have held that their
state constitutions create an enforceable right to an "adequate"' 2 or
"basic"' 3 education. Several courts have classified this right as
"fundamental," holding that only a compelling government interest
justifies its infringement. 4
Because most of the school financing cases recognizing a right to
a substantive level of education have been decided in the last
decade," it is not clear yet whether families will be able to use this
constitutional right to hold local school systems accountable for
1996) (finding no judicially manageable or discoverable standards to enforce constitutional
language requiring "high-quality" educational services); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662
A.2d 40, 57 (R.I. 1995) (directing the plaintiffs to seek relief from the Rhode Island
legislature because it had "virtually unreviewable discretion" over public schools).
12. E.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989)
(holding that each Kentucky child must be provided with equal opportunity and access to
an "adequate education"); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont I"), 635 A.2d
1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993) (holding that the New Hampshire public schools have a duty to
provide a "constitutionally adequate education" to every educable child).
13. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368-69 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that
the New York schools must provide a "sound basic education"): Leandro v. State, 346
N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997) (holding that the North Carolina Constitution
guarantees every child the opportunity to receive a "sound basic education"); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 76-77 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (holding that the
Washington legislature must provide funding to ensure a "basic education" to students).
14. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir.
Ct. 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 110, 159 (Ala. 1993);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont II"), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997);
Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357,488 S.E.2d at 261.
15. See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 624 So. 2d at 159 (1993); Roosevelt
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 814 & n.7 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc)
(plurality opinion); Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734
(Idaho 1993); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1183-87 (Kan. 1994);
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 (1989); School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, 659 A.2d 854,
857 n.5 (Me. 1995); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 787 (Md.
1983); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass.
1993); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (en banc); Helena Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989), amended by 784 P.2d 412 (Mont.
1990); Claremont 1, 635 A.2d at 1376 (1993); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J.
1973); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 368-69 (1982); Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255
(1997); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ohio 1997); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of
Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State,
515 S.E.2d 535,540 (S.C. 1999); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,
150-52 (Tenn. 1993); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94-95; Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877-78 (W. Va. 1979);
Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995); see also Exira
Community Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 789, 796 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing the
right to an adequate education in a case challenging Iowa's open enrollment law, which
allows families to enroll their children in schools outside the districts in which they live);
Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985) (recognizing a
right to an adequate education in a case focusing on student suspensions).
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failure to educate their children. A handful of constitutional claims
against local school districts have been asserted, however,16 and
plaintiffs have found some success in states where courts have
declared the right to education to be fundamental.
This Comment explores the issues involved in applying the
constitutional right to a quality education beyond the school financing
context. Part I uses the school financing cases as a starting point,
analyzing how courts have come to focus on the right to an adequate
education as a way to provide poor school districts with meaningful
relief.'8  Part II discusses cases subsequent to the school financing
precedents seeking relief against local schools for failing to provide an
adequate education.' 9 The remaining Parts explore legal theories and
policy issues that courts likely will encounter in dealing with future
claims. Part III discusses three causes of action that parents might
advance to enforce their children's constitutional rights.2 Part IV
analyzes whether adequacy litigation is judicially manageable
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A QUALITY
EDUCATION
Tracing the historical development of school financing litigation
helps to explain the paradox of courts refusing to judge educational
quality in one context while simultaneously declaring broad
constitutional rights to such quality in another.' Parents and school
16. See, e.g., Hayworth v. School Dist. No. 19, Rosebud County, 795 P.2d 470, 472-73
(Mont. 1990) (rejecting a claim by parents who argued that school officials had violated
their children's right to education by failing to provide safe schools); Bennett v. City Sch.
Dist., 497 N.Y.S.2d 72, 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (rejecting a claim by a parent that the
local school system's program for talented and gifted students violated her child's right to
a basic education); Ramsdell v. North River Sch. Dist. No. 200, 704 P.2d 606, 609 (Wash.
1985) (en banc) (declining to recognize a constitutional violation of the right to a basic
education based on the evidence presented in the case); see also Part II (discussing cases).
17. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the State must
intervene because local mismanagement threatened to close schools six weeks before the
official end of the school year); Cathe A. v. Doddridge County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d
340, 349 (W. Va. 1997) (requiring that school districts provide free alternative education to
students suspended for one year). The holdings in both of these cases were based on
earlier school financing precedents holding that education is a fundamental right and did
not explicitly address whether the level of education provided was inadequate. See infra
notes 168-71, 179-83 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 22-93 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 94-128 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 129-300 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 301-352 and accompanying text.
22. Nearly every state has faced at least one round of school financing litigation. See,
e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993),
reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 110 (Ala. 1993); Matanuska-
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Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d
634 (Ariz. 1998); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz.
1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Tucker
v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1996); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist.
No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest ("Serrano II"), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.
1976); Serrano v. Priest ("Serrano I"), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Lujan v. Colorado State
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); Horton v. Meskill ("Horton I1"), 486
A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985); Horton v. Meskill ("Horton I"), 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977);
Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996)
(per curiam); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Idaho Schs. for Equal
Educ. Opportunity v. State ("ISEEO II"), 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998); Idaho Schs. for
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ. ("ISEEO II"), 912 P.2d 644 (Idaho
1996); Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans ("ISEEO I"), 850 P.2d 724
(Idaho 1993); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Committee for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (IM. 1996); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767
(Ill. 1976); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Charlet v. Legislature, 713 So. 2d 1199
(La. Ct. App. 1998), remedial writ denied, 730 So. 2d 934 (La. 1998), reconsideration
denied, 734 So. 2d 1221 (La. 1999); School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, 659 A.2d
854 (Me. 1995); Montgomery County v. Bradford, 691 A.2d 1281 (Md. 1997); Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); McDuffy v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Milliken v. Green ("Green II"),
212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973) (en banc); Milliken v. Green ("Green I"), 203 N.W.2d 457
(Mich. 1972) (en bane); East Jackson Pub. Schs. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) (per curiam); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (en bane); Committee for
Educ. Equality v. State ("CEE II"), 967 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1998) (en bane); Committee for
Educ. Equality v. State ("CEE I"), 878 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), amended by 784 P.2d 412
(Mont. 1990); State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1974); Gould v. Orr,
506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993) (per curiam); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont
III"), No. 97-001, 1999 N.H. LEXIS 101 (Oct. 15, 1999); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
("Claremont I"), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
("Claremont I"), 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Abbott v. Burke ("Abbott V"), 710 A.2d 450
(N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke ("Abbott I"), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Robinson v. Cahill
("Robinson VII"), 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) (per curiam); Robinson v. Cahill ("Robinson
I"), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661
(N.Y. 1995); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995);
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336,
488 S.E.2d 249 (1997); Britt v. North Carolina State Ed. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357
S.E.2d 432 (1987); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994);
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Cincinnati Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d
1135 (Okla. 1987); Coalition for Equitable Sh. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or.
1991) (en bane); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675
(Or. Ct. App. 1995); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999); Danson v.
Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995);
Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999); Richland County v.
Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Tennessee Small Sh. Sys. v McWherter, 851 S.W.2d
139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno ("Edgewood IV"), 917 S.W.2d 717
(Tex. 1995); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
("Edgewood III"), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
("Edgewood I"), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
("Edgewood I"), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138
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districts filed the first school financing lawsuits in the 1960s to
challenge states' reliance on local property taxes to fund education
because population shifts had created glaring disparities between
wealthy suburban schools and poor rural and inner-city districts. 3
School finance reformers argued that reliance on local property taxes
was inherently unfair because school districts with small tax bases
never could raise as much money per student as wealthy districts,
even if they set much higher tax rates.24 Although state courts
traditionally had deferred to legislatures' broad discretion over
education, state judges decided to hear these cases because they
raised important constitutional questions about whether the quality of
students' education should depend on where they live. 5
(Va. 1994); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (per curiam); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530
P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974) (en banc); State ex rel. Bds. of Educ. v. Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113 (W.
Va. 1988); Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859
(W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d
141 (Wis. 1976); Vincent v. Voight, 589 N.W.2d 455 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998), petition for
review granted, 602 N.W.2d 758 (Wis. 1999); Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 985
P.2d 964 (Wyo. 1999); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
23. See, e.g., Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Burruss v. Wilkerson,
310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970) (per curiam); McInnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IlI. 1968), affd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969) (per curiam). For background on school finance litigation, see generally MARK G.
YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 591-649 (3d ed. 1992); Enrich,
supra note 10; William F. Dietz, Note, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education
Reform Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193 (1996); Margaret Rose Westbrook, Comment,
School Finance Litigation Comes to North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2123,2125-35 (1995).
All states except Hawaii and Michigan rely on local property taxes to raise a significant
portion of school funding. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1171
n.169 (1995); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky,
and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219,219 n.2 (1990). This system was relatively equitable to begin with, but shifting
urbanization patterns concentrated wealth first in cities and then in suburbs over the
course of the twentieth century. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 9-15 (1973); Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1072,1074 (1991) [hereinafter Unfulfilled Promises].
24. See, e.g., Horton 1, 376 A.2d at 366-68 (noting that 70% of Connecticut school
funding came from local sources and that local tax bases ranged from $20,000 to $170,000
per pupil). Moreover, poor districts that wanted to raise their tax rates often were blocked
by state tax rate ceilings. See Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1251-52; Richard J. Stark, Education
Reform: Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions' Education Finance Provisions-
Adequacy vs. Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 622; Thro, supra note 23, at 219 n.2.
25. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209 ("This duty must be exercised even ... when the
court's view of the constitution is contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the
public."); Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 87 n.7 ("The power of the judiciary to
enforce rights recognized by the constitution, even in the absence of implementing
legislation, is clear."); Campbell County Sch. Dist., 907 P.2d at 1264 ("When the
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Agreeing to hear the claims, however, was only the first step. 26
Courts have struggled to find a legal theory that would help children
in substandard schools without placing heavy political, financial, and
legal burdens on state governments.27 The case law recognizing a
constitutional right to an adequate education grew out of this
struggle, mushrooming in the last decade as courts determined that
adequacy analyses could provide students relief without requiring
complicated and controversial programs designed to equalize
education between school districts." In focusing on how adequacy
theories could solve the school financing problem,29 however,
advocates do not appear to have considered how the right to an
adequate education might be applied in other contexts.
A. Original Focus on Equality Arguments
School financing litigation can be divided into three "waves," the
first of which focused on equality arguments based in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment0 Finance reform
advocates took this approach in part because the United States
Constitution had proven to be an effective mechanism for correcting
social injustices since the Supreme Court used the Equal Protection
clause in the 1950s and 1960s to dismantle segregation and to protect
a broad range of rights?' Moreover, constitutional case law appeared
legislature's transgression is a failure to act, our duty to protect individual rights includes
compelling legislative action required by the constitution."). In contrast, when plaintiffs
brought individual educational malpractice claims based on negligence and other theories,
state courts often dismissed the cases because of concerns about separation of powers.
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. 1979) ("[T]he courts will
intervene in the administration of the public school system only in the most exceptional
circumstances involving gross violations of defined public policy." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); supra notes 4, 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
26. Indeed, some state courts agreed to hear the claims, only to hold that separation
of powers precluded relief. See, e.g., McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 157 (emphasizing the
importance of judicial review); id. at 165 (deferring to the Georgia legislature to define
constitutional language requiring the provision of an "adequate" education).
27. See infra Part I.A.
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 166-70; Heise, supra note 23, at 1168-76; Allen W.
Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L.
REv. 1325 (1992); Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 326-33 (1991); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis
During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a
Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 603-04 (1994).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Thro, supra note 29, at 597-604 (discussing
the three waves of litigation).
31. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 124; Heise, supra note 23, at 1153-54.
2000]
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to provide strong support for school financing challenges. The school
desegregation cases had hinted that students might have a
constitutional right to education,32 and federal courts had handed
down a number of other decisions requiring states to provide critical
government services to poor citizens for free when the citizens could
not afford to pay associated fees.3
Using the framework of equal protection analysis that the federal
courts had developed in the 1950s and 1960s, school finance
reformers argued that education was a fundamental right and that the
courts should subject state financing systems to "strict scrutiny.' 4
Under the strict scrutiny analysis, infringements upon fundamental
rights are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest. By comparison, courts apply a
"rational relation" test to economic and social legislation that does
not infringe on fundamental rights, upholding such legislation as long
as it is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective.36 The
California Supreme Court adopted a strict scrutiny analysis in 1971
and struck down the state's school financing system,37 but the victory
32. In particular, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), inspired equal
protection challenges because of its strong language. See supra note 1 and accompanying
text. Brown stated that the "opportunity [to obtain a public education], where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms." Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also Enrich, supra note 10, at 117 (suggesting that
Brown's invitation to pursue the right to education beyond the context of segregation was
"both obvious and difficult to decline").
33. These cases involved both equal protection and substantive due process claims.
See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that denying divorce
because of a party's inability to pay court costs violates due process); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that equal protection requires counsel to
be provided for appeals of right to indigent criminal defendants); Enrich, supra note 10, at
117-19; Thro, supra note 23, at 223 n.18, 224 n.28.
34. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest ("Serrano I"), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971). Federal
courts apply "strict scrutiny" analysis in cases in which the government treats similar
people differently based on a "suspect classification" or in a way that burdens some
groups' ability to exercise fundamental rights. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 629-30 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 665-66 (1966) (right to vote); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (race). "Quasi-suspect"
classifications are examined under "heightened scrutiny" to ensure that they are
substantially related to an important government interest. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456,461 (1988) (legitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (gender).
35. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-32.
36. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,463 n.7 (1981).
37. See Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1244 (striking down the state's school financing system
under both the federal and state equal protection clauses). The California Supreme Court
not only held that education was a fundamental right, but also applied strict scrutiny
because it concluded that a suspect classification-poverty-was involved in the case. See
id. at 1244, 1258. Later courts rejected arguments that people in poverty are a suspect
class because the courts feared that such a holding would apply strict scrutiny to a broad
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proved short lived. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court held
that education is not a federal fundamental right in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.
In Rodriguez, parents sued an urban Texas school district that
contributed only $26 per pupil in local property taxes, compared with
$333 per pupil in the most affluent district in the San Antonio area.3 9
The parents challenged the Texas financing system on the grounds
that it interfered with their children's exercise of a fundamental right
to an education.' The Court acknowledged that the funding
disparities were "substantial," but refused to remedy them in part
because of concern that such a precedent would extend to other
public services funded by local tax dollars.4' The majority declined to
hold that education was a fundamental right, reasoning that
"fundamental" status is limited to those rights that are explicitly or
implicitly included in the U.S. Constitution. 2 Instead, the Court held
that education should be evaluated under the rational relation test
because it is an affirmative government service.43 Under this test, the
Court upheld the Texas financing system as a rational attempt to
range of government services. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005, 1019-22 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); McUsic, supra note 29, at 313-14; infra note 40
(discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of a claim that poverty is a suspect class).
38. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. See id. at 9-15 (citing 1967-68 budget figures). In addition to the local money, the
state provided roughly $225 per student, and the federal government provided a small
amount of funding. See id.
40. See id. at 17, 29. Although the plaintiffs were Hispanic and brought their class
action on behalf of minority students or students who were poor and lived in poor school
districts, the Court did not discuss racial or ethnic classifications in its opinion. See id. at
4-5. The Court also rejected arguments that the school financing scheme burdened a
suspect class. See id. at 28. By focusing on poor school districts rather than poor
individuals, the Rodriguez Court distinguished the case from its earlier decisions requiring
governments to provide services for the indigent. See id. at 20-25.
41. Id. at 15, 53-54 (suggesting that local taxation and government services require
"jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary"). The Court also raised federalism
concerns, noting that it usually defers to state legislatures on fiscal and education policy.
See id. at 40-44.
42. See id. at 33-35. The Court acknowledged its broad language in Brown v. Board
of Education, but held that importance to society or to individuals is not enough to make a
right fundamental. See id. at 29-30; see also supra notes 1, 32 and accompanying text
(quoting Brown). Although the plaintiffs argued that a right to education was implied in
the Constitution as an essential component of the rights to vote and to free speech, the
Court rejected this logic because it might also extend to food, shelter, and other basic
needs. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-37; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)
(refusing to hold that housing is a fundamental right); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970) (refusing to hold that welfare benefits are a fundamental right).
43. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37-39 (suggesting that strict scrutiny is not "sensitive"
to the nature of affirmative education programs).
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enhance local control of public schools.'
Although Rodriguez hinted that the outcome might have been
different had the plaintiffs been deprived of an adequate education,45
the defeat triggered a second wave of litigation as school finance
reformers shifted their focus from federal to state constitutional
arguments.46 Because all fifty states' constitutions contain clauses
providing for free public education,47 reformers brought state equal
protection claims and relied on Rodriguez to argue that education
was a fundamental right because it was explicitly specified in the state
constitutional texts. 8  Most courts rejected this logic, however,
44. See id. at 49, 54-55.
45. The Court stated that there was no basis for finding interference with fundamental
rights when "no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child
with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process." Id. at 37. The Court has
not clarified this statement in subsequent decisions. See Kadramas v. Dickinson Pub.
Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 221-23, 230 (1982). Accordingly, some commentators argue that there is a
federal right to an adequate education. See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End
of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 567 (1992); Julius Chambers,
Adequate Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
55,67-72 (1987).
46. See Heise, supra note 23, at 1157. The shift was hastened by a New Jersey
Supreme Court decision two weeks after Rodriguez that struck down the state's school
finance system based entirely on state constitutional arguments. See Robinson v. Cahill
("Robinson I"), 303 A.2d 273,295 (N.J. 1973); infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
47. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1; GA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1;
KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl. a; MONT. CONST. art.
X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J.
CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.C.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST.
art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1;
S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONsT. ch. 2, § 68; VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3;
WYO. CONsT. art. VII, § 1; see also infra note 218 (discussing the debate over the
interpretation of the Mississippi Constitution). Many of these provisions are reprinted in
ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONsTITUIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1998), and in
Hubsch, supra note 29, at 1343-48.
48. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33. Not all states have explicit constitutional equal
protection clauses, but many state courts have interpreted other provisions to mandate
equal protection. See Thro, supra note 23, at 229-30 & nn.49-50; Robert F. Williams,
Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1985).
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because they were concerned that the Rodriguez test would require
them to categorize a wide variety of other public services enumerated
in their state constitutions as fundamental rights.49 Instead, the
majority of jurisdictions upheld their school financing systems as
rationally related to the goal of increasing local control over public
schools.50 Only four courts struck down their school financing
systems during the second wave of litigation based solely on state
equal protection arguments.51
Part of the state courts' reluctance to recognize education rights
as fundamental may have been prompted by the experiences in those
states where school financing cases had succeeded.52 Although
Plaintiffs in a few states also argued for equal funding based on language in their
constitutions' education articles. See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 636
(Idaho 1975) (focusing on a constitutional provision requiring "uniform" public schools).
49. State courts rejected the Rodriguez test because their constitutions tend to be
more statutory in nature than the federal Constitution in that they contain provisions on a
wide variety of relatively minor government activities. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983) (expressing concern about creating a
fundamental rights precedent that would apply to constitutional provisions on parking and
loan financing); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 n.5 (N.Y. 1982)
(explaining that because the state constitution is not required to list a complete
declaration of all powers of the state government, it covers a broad range of subjects of
varying importance to society); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45 (Or. 1976) (refusing to
hold that education is a fundamental right for fear that such a precedent would apply to
the state constitution's liquor-by-the-drink provision).
State courts were also reluctant to find that education was a fundamental right
based on a more general test looking at its importance to society because they saw no easy
way to distinguish other basic needs for food, shelter, and safety. See, e.g., Robinson I, 303
A.2d at 283-84; McUsic, supra note 29, at 313-14; Thro, note 23, at 242.
50. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982) (en
bane); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167-68 (Ga. 1981); Thompson, 537 P.2d at
645; Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 788; East Jackson Pub. Schs. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 305-06
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366; Cincinnati Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 821 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc.
v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1147 (Okla. 1987); Olsen, 554 P.2d at 146-47; Danson v. Casey, 399
A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. 1988);
see also Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Ariz. 1973) (declaring education to be a
fundamental right, but applying a rational relation test); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd.
of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282,289-90, 357 S.E.2d 432, 436-37 (1987) (concluding that access
to education is a fundamental right but that equal educational opportunity is not).
51. Arkansas struck down its school financing system under a rational relation test,
see DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983), while three other
state courts held that education is a fundamental right and invalidated their school
financing systems under strict scrutiny. See Serrano v. Priest ("Serrano II"), 557 P.2d 929,
950-51 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill ("Horton I"), 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333, 335 (Wyo. 1980); see
also infra note 189 (discussing later changes to Connecticut's strict scrutiny analysis).
52. See Thro, supra note 23, at 233 n.64 (suggesting that New Jersey's experience may
have made other states more cautious).
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equality seemed a simple concept in the abstract, courts and
legislatures had difficulty deciding what exactly should be equalized-
the capacity to raise money, the actual money provided, the quality of
educational services, or educational outcomes such as test scores-
and how to achieve such equality. 3 Reform efforts also generated a
backlash from people who wanted to preserve local control of
schools54 and from residents of wealthy districts who resented
spending caps. In a few states, reform efforts stalled for years and
created significant tensions between the judicial and legislative
branches,56 prompting commentators and state judges to question
whether courts were capable of accomplishing meaningful reform. 7
By the early 1980s, the number of school financing cases and
victories began to drop, and some observers believed the reform
movement was dying out.58 The emergence of a new argument based
53. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 145-55; Heise, supra note 23, at 1168-69. The debate
was also complicated by conflicting evidence about whether increases in school spending
actually improved student achievement. See William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard
Questions Posed by Rodriguez Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational
Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721, 724-27
(1992); Heise, supra note 23, at 1166-68; Stark, supra note 24, at 614-15.
54. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 160-61; Heise, supra note 23, at 1169-72.
55. In at least one state, taxpayers successfully challenged a "negative aid" provision
requiring that money from wealthy districts be redistributed to poorer school systems. See
Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141,143 (Wis. 1976).
56. In New Jersey, for instance, school finance reform measures cost more than $1
billion and finance litigation continued for 25 years. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke ("Abbott
V"), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke ("Abbott I"), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985);
Robinson v. Cahill ("Robinson VII"), 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill
("Robinson I"), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Russell S. Harrison & G. Alan Tarr, School
Finance and Inequality in New Jersey, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES:
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS 178, 178-201 (G. Alan
Tarr ed., 1996) (reporting that court-ordered changes had a relatively modest effect on
school funding despite the political controversy); Enrich, supra note 10, at 129-35;
Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 23, at 1075-78. To force the New Jersey legislature to
complete finance reform, the state supreme court at one point threatened to redistribute
school aid itself and later issued an injunction forbidding the operation of the state's
school system as unconstitutional. See Harrison & Tarr, supra, at 182.
Texas also spent several years and more than $1 billion reforming its school
financing system. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno ("Edgewood IV"), 917 S.W.2d
717 (Tex. 1995); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. ("Edgewood III"), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
("Edgewood I"), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist v. Kirby
("Edgewood I"), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). One observer compared the process to a
Russian novel: "[I]t's long, tedious, and everyone dies at the end." Mark Yudof, School
Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 499,499 (1991).
57. See Thro, supra note 23, at 232-33 n.63.
58. See, e.g., iL at 232 n.62 (reporting that the number of cases dropped 40% from
1981 to 1989 compared with 1973 to 1981). DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d
90, 93 (Ark. 1983), was the only successful case in the early 1980s.
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on a constitutional right to an adequate education re-energized
parents, activists, and poor school systems in the 1990s.
B. New Focus on Adequacy Arguments
While most of the second-wave cases dealt with equality
arguments, a minority focused on state constitutional language
requiring the provision of "adequate" or "thorough" systems of
public education.59 Robinson v. Cahill,' a New Jersey case handed
down just a few weeks after Rodriguez, started this trend by striking
down the state's school financing system for failure to provide a
"thorough and efficient" system of schools rather than for violating
equal protection.61 A handful of other state courts also recognized
that their constitutions required a substantive level of education, but
concluded that current school funding systems met those
requirements. 62 After Robinson, only two other second-wave courts
struck down their school financing systems based on adequacy
arguments.63
59. For analyses of the textual support for adequacy arguments in state constitutional
provisions, see McUsic, supra note 29, at 309 & n.4, 319-26,333-39; Gershon M. Ratner, A
New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TaX. L.
REV. 777, 814-16 (1985); Thro, supra note 23, at 243-46 & nn.130-41.
60. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
61. Id. at 283, 295 (declining to decide the case based on New Jersey's equal
protection clause for fear that the clause "may be unmanageable if it is called upon to
supply categorical answers in the vast area of human needs, choosing those which must be
met and a single basis upon which the State must act"). Later New Jersey opinions have
focused more on equality arguments than adequacy concerns, prompting both equality
and adequacy proponents to cite the New Jersey cases for support. See Enrich, supra note
10, at 129-35; supra note 56 (describing the 25-year history of New Jersey litigation).
62. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981) (acknowledging
that the Georgia Constitution required the provision of an "adequate education," but
declining to provide relief because no evidence had been offered to show that students in
any particular district were being deprived of such an education); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 787 (Md. 1983) (holding that the plaintiffs were not
being denied the right to an adequate education as guaranteed by the Maryland
Constitution); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982) (recognizing a
constitutional requirement of a sound basic education, but stating that courts would
intervene only in cases of "gross and glaring inadequacy"); Cincinnati Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ohio 1979) (holding that the state's school financing
system is constitutional to the extent that it ensures that each child receives an adequate
education); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1146, 1149 (Okla. 1987)
(recognizing a constitutional guarantee of a basic, adequate education according to state
school board standards, but noting that the plaintiffs had not alleged that they were
deprived of such an education).
63. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 78 (Wash. 1978) (en bane);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
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The first case, Seattle School District No. 1 v. State,' challenged
Washington's reliance on special voter-approved levies to provide
local funding for schools.65 Relying on a constitutional provision
stating that it was "the paramount duty of the state to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders,"'  the Washington Supreme Court held that the state
legislature has an affirmative duty to provide funding to ensure
students receive a "basic education." 67 The court stated broadly that
a basic education is not limited to reading, writing, and arithmetic, but
also includes the opportunities needed to equip children as citizens,
workers, and competitors in the "marketplace of ideas."' s Despite
making this proclamation, the court left the details and execution to
the legislature.69
One year later, in Pauley v. Kelly,7' the West Virginia high court
went even further than its Washington counterpart and interpreted its
constitution's education provision as requiring public schools to meet
"high quality" standards.7' Pauley declared that education is a
fundamental right for equal protection purposes, an issue that Seattle
School District No. 1 never explicitly addressed.7 2 Rather than
turning the job over to the legislature, the West Virginia court
detailed its own quality standards and remanded the case.73 On
64. 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).
65. See id. at 78.
66. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. The court emphasized that education is the only
"paramount duty" listed in the Washington Constitution and held that students have a
correlative "right" of equal stature, but did not discuss whether this right is fundamental
for equal protection purposes. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85, 91-92.
67. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 96-97.
68. Id. at 94-95.
69. The court overruled the trial court's decision to retain jurisdiction in the case as
inconsistent with the assumption that the legislature would do its job. See id. at 105.
70. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
71. See id at 878.
72. See id; supra note 66 (discussing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1).
73. See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878. The court defined "thorough and efficient" schools,
stating:
Legally recognized elements in this definition are development in every child to
his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add, subtract, multiply and divide
numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent that the child will be
equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that
affect his own governance; (4) self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her total
environment to allow the child to intelligently choose life work-to know his or
her options; (5) work-training and advanced academic training as the child may
intelligently choose; (6) recreational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts,
such as music, theatre, literature and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both
behavioral and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others in this society.
Implicit are supportive services: (1) good physical facilities, instructional
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remand the lower court held that the existing benchmarks adopted by
the state board of education did not meet Pauley's "high quality"
standards and struck down the school financing system.74
The Washington and West Virginia cases emerged as critical
precedents a decade later when decisions by several state courts in
1989 triggered a "third wave" of school financing litigation based
largely on adequacy arguments The most influential of the early
third-wave cases was Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. ,76 i
which the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated not only the state's
school financing scheme but its entire system of public education.77
After interpreting constitutional language regarding "efficient"
schools as requiring that every child receive an equal opportunity to
obtain an adequate education, the Court held that the legislature had
failed in its duty to provide "efficient" schools.78 In what would
become a prototype for other state courts around the country, the
Kentucky opinion provided guidelines about the substantive content
of the constitutional requirement:
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to
provide each and every child with at least the seven
following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written
communication skills to enable students to function in a
materials and personnel; (2) careful state and local supervision to prevent waste
and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency.
Id. at 877. The opinion emphasized that "great weight" should be given to legislatively
established standards created through democratic procedures, but did not suggest that
courts were institutionally incapable of defining the constitutional requirements. Id.
74. See Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128, 131, 136-37 (W. Va. 1984) (upholding the
lower court decision).
75. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989);
Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 692 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby ("Edgewood I"), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568,585 (Wis. 1989). Commentators dubbed the decisions in Kentucky, Montana,
and Texas as the beginning of a "third wave" of school financing litigation because they
based their holdings solely on their state constitutions' education articles, rather than
equal protection analysis. See Thro, supra note 23, at 221-22, 239. However, all of the
1989 opinions reflected a mix of adequacy and equality concerns. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at
211, 212, 215 (interpreting the Kentucky constitution as requiring "equal" educational
opportunity); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist No. 1, 769 P.2d at 689, 692 (guaranteeing a quality
education that provides equal educational opportunity to each person in the state);
Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (focusing on "efficiency" of public schools); Kukor, 436
N.W.2d at 579, 582 (suggesting that failure to meet state education standards might
implicate a fundamental right); see also supra note 56 (discussing later Texas cases).
76. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
77. See iL at 215.
78. See id. at 205-13. Although the court repeatedly used terms such as "fundamental
right," "equality," and "equal opportunity," it never applied a traditional strict scrutiny
analysis. Id at 211, 212, 215.
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complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to
enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient
understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge
and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness;
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the
job market. 9
The court determined that state and local officials were free to
establish higher targets, but the Kentucky General Assembly at least
had to meet the standards set forth in its opinion.80
In the wake of Rose, commentators enthusiastically endorsed the
new focus on adequacy of education as having both a stronger
theoretical basis and fewer political and logistical problems than the
earlier equality theories. The adequacy approach posed much less
risk of creating broad new rights to government services because
courts could base their decisions on the unique language of their
constitutions' education articles.8' Moreover, courts could provide
relief without requiring substantial interventions to equalize
education programs or to interfere with local control mechanisms. s2
By focusing on quality rather than dollar equity, courts could set
broad targets and then step back to allow the other branches to
determine their own means of meeting the goals. 3 Supporters of the
79. Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
80. See id at 212 n.22. The court dismissed concerns about separation of powers,
emphasizing that it was only determining "the intent of the framers. Carrying-out that
intent is the duty of the General Assembly." IM at 212. The justices did not retain
jurisdiction over the case. See i at 214-15.
81. See McUsic, supra note 29, at 315; Thro, supra note 23, at 241-42.
82. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 180-83; Heise, supra note 23, at 1174-75; McUsic,
supra note 29, at 327-29. Commentators also argued that adequacy would not cost as
much as equality and would pose less of a threat to wealthy districts because it did not
require "leveling" all programs. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 168-69, 180; McUsic, supra
note 29, at 327-38.
83. See Heise, supra note 23, at 1153; McUsic, supra note 29, at 330; Dietz, supra note
23, at 1204. This approach also allowed courts to avoid complex equalization formulas and
the debate over whether increases in school funding improve student achievement. See
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adequacy approach acknowledged that defining an adequate
education would be a challenge, but they argued that standardized
testing and accountability programs implemented in the 1980s would
provide objective measures of educational quality. 5
Courts soon faced a flood of adequacy-based school financing
claims. Between 1990 and 1999, at least a dozen states recognized a
cause of action for failure to provide an adequate education or to
meet other substantive state constitutional requirements.8 6 Several of
McUsic, supra, note 29, at 315-17. But see Thro, supra note 29, at 616 (concluding that
except for the Kentucky court, all third-wave cases assumed automatically that money
would solve adequacy problems).
84. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 179-82 (discussing the risk in giving up the "moral
high ground" by adopting an adequacy approach and the risk that standards would be set
so low as to be meaningless); Dietz, supra note 23, at 1203 (arguing that the right to an
adequate education "is meaningless without a workable, and hence enforceable, standard
to measure adequacy"); Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 23, at 1078-85 (arguing that the
New Jersey saga is partially attributable to lack of clear judicial standards).
85. By adopting generally accepted standards, commentators argued, courts could
maintain their traditional enforcement role without having to make policy. See Heise,
supra note 23, at 1175-76 (discussing the educational standards movement); McUsic, supra
note 29, at 329-33 (arguing that accountability programs and standardized testing provide
objective measures of educational outputs); Dietz, supra note 23, at 1212-19 (arguing that
courts should rely on existing state standards to preserve their legitimacy).
86. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir.
Ct. 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993)
(holding that Alabama schools must provide "substantially equitable and adequate
educational opportunities"); Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd.
of Educ. ("ISEEO I"), 850 P.2d 724, 734-35 (Idaho 1993) (recognizing a claim based on a
constitutional provision requiring a "thorough" system of public schools); Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1183-87 (Kan. 1994) (upholding a lower court
decision using existing education standards to determine whether the quality of education
met a constitutional requirement for "suitable" public school financing); McDuffy v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (holding that
the quality of education in poor school districts did not meet constitutional standards);
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (en banc) (holding that cases alleging
failure to provide an adequate education should be analyzed under a strict scrutiny
analysis); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont II") 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H.
1997) (holding that an adequate public education is a fundamental right); Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667-68 (N.Y. 1995) (reinstating a claim
alleging violation of the duty to provide adequate education under the New York
Constitution); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336,357,488 S.E.2d 249,261 (1997) (holding that
a "sound basic education" is a fundamental right); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 745
(Ohio 1997) (striking down a school financing system that failed to provide the resources
needed to give students "a minimally adequate education"); Abbeville County Sch. Dist.
v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (holding that the South Carolina Constitution
requires the legislature to provide each child with the opportunity to receive a "minimally
adequate education"); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) (holding
that the Virginia Constitution mandates that each school division meet standards of
quality as established by the state legislature); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907
P.2d 1238,1263-64 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that the constitutional right to receive a "quality"
education is judicially enforceable); see also Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop,
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the decisions followed the trend started in Rose and Pauley by
establishing judicially created definitions of an adequate education,'
while other decisions fell more in line with Seattle School District No.
1 by looking to state statutory and administrative standards to define
their constitutions' requirementss 8 A few indicated that they would
recognize adequacy claims, but did not define the constitutional
standards because they were not decisive in the case at hand. 9
As the number of adequacy precedents grew and courts became
more comfortable with the idea of adjudicating educational quality,
later third-wave cases abandoned much of the caution with which
earlier courts had approached the issue of fundamental rights and
began to combine adequacy requirements with equal protection
analyses.' A number of the recent cases have declared explicitly that
the right to an adequate education is fundamental and have used
broad language regarding the courts' duty to apply strict scrutiny
analysis.91 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for example, stated
877 P.2d 806, 814-15 & n.7 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (recognizing a
"substantive education requirement" in the Arizona Constitution, but deciding the case on
other grounds); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-52 (Tenn.
1993) (holding that the Tennessee General Assembly's duty to provide a public school
system that meets certain substantive standards is judicially enforceable, but deciding the
case on other grounds). See generally Thro, supra note 29, at 598-99 (concluding the third
wave has been the most significant in the number of cases and victories for plaintiffs).
87. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554 (adopting the Rose criteria as "guidelines" as to
what constitutes an "education" under the Massachusetts Constitution); Claremont 11, 703
A.2d at 1359 (adopting the Rose criteria as "benchmarks" for New Hampshire schools).
Four other states developed their own criteria. See Alabama Coalition for Equity,
Inc., 624 So. 2d at 166; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 666; Leandro, 346
N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Abbeville County Sch. Dist., 515 S.E.2d at 540; see also infra
Part IV.A (discussing the judicial standards in more depth).
88. See ISEEO 1, 850 P.2d at 734 (holding that school districts must meet state board
of education requirements); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229, 885 P.2d at 1183-87 (agreeing with
the district court's analysis relying upon education standards adopted by the Kansas
legislature and state board of education); Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 308 (looking to
Minnesota's minimum accreditation standards); Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142 (stating that
schools must meet standards of quality established by the Virginia legislature).
89. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66, 877 P.2d at 814-15 & n.7; Tennessee
Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 150-52.
90. See supra notes 49-51, 61 and accompanying text (discussing state courts' concerns
that declaring education to be a fundamental right would necessitate the extension of the
same reasoning to other government services and require massive and controversial
equalization programs). The West Virginia court was the only court to apply strict
scrutiny analysis in the original adequacy cases. See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878.
91. See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 624 So. 2d at 159; Claremont 11, 703 A.2d
at 1359; Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261; Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142; Campbell
County Sch. Dist, 907 P.2d at 1263. Other states have limited strict scrutiny to cases
alleging failure to provide an adequate education and use the rational relation test to
evaluate issues above that level. See, e.g., Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315.
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that "when an individual school or school district offers something
less than educational adequacy, the governmental action or lack of
action that is the root cause of the disparity will be examined by a
standard of strict judicial scrutiny." g
The cases and commentaries on school financing reform have
paid little attention to what the recognition of these newfound
constitutional rights to an adequate education-particularly where
those rights have been accorded fundamental status-will mean
outside the context of school finance litigation. The increasingly
broad language used by the New Hampshire Supreme Court and
other recent third-wave decisions, however, suggests that
constitutional violations are not limited to statewide financial
problems, but rather may include individual deprivations of an
adequate education.93 As Part II demonstrates, a few plaintiffs have
moved from challenging statewide problems to bringing individual
constitutional claims against local school systems for failing to
provide quality academics, enrichment programs, and safe
environments. It may be only a matter of time before other third-
wave courts are asked to rule on the right to an adequate education in
the larger context of public school operations.
II. ADEQUACY BEYOND THE SCHOOL FINANCING CONTEXT
To date, most of the cases that have built on the school financing
litigation have focused on the significance of education as a
fundamental right without testing the qualitative standards
recognized in the original cases.94 Plaintiffs in a few states, however,
92. Claremont 11, 703 A.2d at 1359.
93. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,
548, 553, 555 (Mass. 1993) (referring to "all" and "each" child in holding that
Massachusetts has an affirmative duty to provide an education); Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347,
354, 355, 488 S.E.2d at 255, 259 (referring broadly to "every," "any," and "each" child as
having a constitutional right to a sound basic education Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v.
State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 541 (S.C. 1999) (stating that the legislature has a duty "to ensure the
provision of a minimally adequate education to each student in South Carolina"); Thro,
supra note 29, at 613 (stating that McDuffy's language suggests that failure to provide an
adequate education to any pupil creates a constitutional violation); Kevin P. Mclessy,
Comment, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability
Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1768, 1781-83 (1995) (suggesting that McDuffy would support
recovery in individual cases alleging failure to educate); William Kent Packard, Note, A
Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v.
State, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1481, 1517-18 (1998) (suggesting that the standards adopted in
North Carolina's school financing litigation imply that any student who fails to receive an
adequate education has a cause of action against the state, but arguing that courts should
defer to the legislature to define the limits of the constitutional claims).
94. For a discussion of the fundamental rights cases, see infra Part III.A.2.
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have brought claims against local schools alleging failure to provide
an adequate education to individual children.95 While none of these
claims have succeeded, the decisions suggest that some state courts
may grant relief to individual students at least in severe cases.96
Among the second-wave courts that struck down their states'
school financing systems based on adequacy arguments, only
Washington appears to have faced subsequent challenges alleging
that local schools failed to provide the substantive level of education
required by the financing precedents. 97 In Ramsdell v. North River
School District No. 200,98 two parents brought a claim alleging that
their local school system had failed to provide a "basic" education
and asking that their children be permitted to attend schools in a
neighboring system.9  Evidence indicated that the students had
received some good grades and reports while in local schools, but
below-average grades and test scores when sent to live with their
uncle in the adjacent town.1' ° The Washington Supreme Court
95. See, e.g., Hayworth v. School Dist. No. 19, 795 P.2d 470, 471 (Mont. 1990);
Ramsdell v. North River Sch. Dist., No. 200, 704 P.2d 606, 609 (Wash. 1985) (en banc).
Other adequacy cases have been brought against urban school districts in Illinois, where
the state constitution requires an "efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services." ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. However, state courts have refused to
adjudicate educational quality both in the urban adequacy cases and in school financing
litigation in part because of concerns about judicially manageable standards for "high
quality" or even minimally adequate education. See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798,
800 (Ill. 1999) (rejecting a constitutional claim charging that state and local school district
officials had failed to provide an adequate education in East St. Louis schools);
Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (I11. 1996) (refusing to grant
relief in school financing litigation because the court could find no judicially manageable
or discoverable standards for judging "high quality" education); Jenkins v. Leininger, 659
N.E.2d 1366, 1372 (111. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of
action under the Illinois education article in a suit against Chicago school officials); see
also Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62
U. CHM. L. RFv. 795, 796 (1995) (discussing the Leininger plaintiffs' request that they
receive vouchers so that their children could attend better schools); see supra notes 335-39
(discussing vouchers as a possible remedy in adequacy cases).
96. See, e.g., Ramsdell, 704 P.2d at 609 (rejecting the plaintiffs' claim where evidence
showed their children were not "blossoming," but not questioning the existence of a cause
of action for violations of the right to an adequate education).
97. West Virginia courts have heard several claims focusing on the status of education
as a fundamental right, but not involving quality issues. See infra notes 169-71 and
accompanying text (discussing cases). Kentucky courts have focused mainly on challenges
over school reforms adopted after the Rose decision. See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Educ. v.
Risner, 913 S.W.2d 327,329 (Ky. 1996) (anti-nepotism laws); Triplett v. Livingston County
Bd. of Educ., 967 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (mandatory standardized testing).
98. 704 P.2d 606 (Wash. 1985).
99. See id. at 609. The home district was fully certified by the state, but only had
about 50 students. See id. at 608.
100. The parents relied on standardized California Achievement Tests indicating that
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rejected the claim based on the record, acknowledging that there
appeared to be a difference in the academic intensity of the two
districts, but declining to hold, without additional evidence, that the
disparity amounted to a constitutional violation.10 1
Three years later in Camer v. Seattle School District No. 1,'1 the
Washington Court of Appeals also rejected a constitutional claim
based on the specific facts of the case.03 The court held that res
judicata barred the plaintiff from bringing most of her claims for
academic inadequacy because she had brought two similar law suits
several years before °4 Regarding the remaining claim, which alleged
failure to teach students the Washington Constitution, the appeals
court held that the plaintiffs did not allege facts that amounted to a
violation of the constitution's education article. 5 Nevertheless, the
court generally affirmed that the education provision "imposes a
judicially enforceable affirmative duty on the State to make ample
provision for the education of children."'06
While the Washington cases appear to leave the door open to
individual claims, the New York courts have cast serious doubt on
whether the New York Constitution's educational article is
enforceable against local school systems. Three years after the state
high court held in Board of Education v. Nyquist 7 that its state
constitution required the New York legislature to provide public
schools that offer a "sound basic education,"'08 an appellate court
their son was in the 29th percentile nationally and that their daughter was below the 50th
percentile in all areas and in the bottom one percent in third-grade reading. They also
presented report cards from the home district reporting that the son was "ahead" and that
the daughter was "blossoming in academic work." Id. at 608. The court placed little
weight on the daughter's first percentile reading score, however, because she moved up to
the 27th percentile when retested later the same year. See id. at 610-11.
101. See id. at 609. The court found no evidence that the home district needed to hire
more employees or improve its physical facilities, and stated that the plaintiffs had failed
to set forth other standards by which the schools could be judged constitutionally
deficient. See id.
102. 762 P.2d 356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
103. See icL at 360.
104. See id. at 359. The previous suits had alleged violations of state education laws
and the right to an adequate education, but were rejected at every level of the court
system. See id. at 358; Camer v. Eikenberry, 703 F.2d 574, 574 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 828 (1983); Camer v. Brouillet, 31 Wash. App. 1097, 1097 (unpublished opinion), pet.
for rev. denied, 97 Wash. 2d 1042 (1982).
105. See Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 762 P.2d at 360. The court also concluded
that the plaintiffs had not shown actual damage and therefore lacked standing. See id
106. It (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc)).
107. 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
108. Id at 369. Despite its holding, the.New York court had warned that it would be
reluctant to intervene except in cases of "gross and glaring inadequacy." Id. In 1995, the
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rejected a constitutional claim against a local school system for the
level of education provided to "talented and gifted" students.109 The
court in Bennett v. City School District"0 gave little explanation for its
holding, stating that the constitutional provision
was never intended to impose a duty flowing directly from a
local school district to individual pupils to ensure that each
pupil receives a minimum level of education, the breach of
which duty would entitle a pupil to compensatory damages.
Here petitioner has not alleged, nor in all likelihood could
she prove, that the modified [talented and gifted] program
or even the conventional classroom, would not provide a
"quality education," let alone a "sound basic education.""'
The court's reasoning is unclear. The first sentence is an
unmarked but direct quote from the first educational malpractice case
in New York, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,"'
which included a claim based on the state constitution's education
article as well as one based on negligence.13  The Donohue court,
which reached its decision three years before the Nyquist school
financing case," 4 rejected the constitutional claim because it read the
education article as placing responsibility for public schools solely on
the state legislature, rather than local school districts.15
Curiously, however, the Bennett decision did not simply recite
Donohue's no-duty rule. Instead, the court emphasized that the
plaintiffs did not allege, and probably could not prove, that they had
been deprived of a sound basic education. 6 However, the court
never explained why this fact was significant if there was no duty to
provide such an education in the first place. The implication is that
the plaintiff lost not because the district owed no duty to the student,
court held that the plaintiffs in a subsequent school financing challenge had alleged gross
educational adequacies sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 668 (N.Y. 1995).
109. See Bennett v. City Sch. Dist., 497 N.Y.S.2d 72, 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). The
district offered a small full-time program for which students were chosen by lottery. The
plaintiff's daughter was not chosen in the lottery and was placed in a part-time program
instead. See id. at 74-75.
110. 497 N.Y.S.2d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
111. Id. at 79 (quoting 1982 N.Y. Laws, ch. 740, § 1; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 369).
112. 391 N.E.2d 1352,1353 (N.Y. 1979).
113. See id. The state education provision reads, "[t]he legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of
this state may be educated." N.Y. CoNST. art. XI, § 1.
114. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 369.
115. See Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353; infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
116. See Bennett, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
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but rather because there had been no breach of the constitutional
duty recognized in Nyquist."7 If this latter interpretation is correct,
plaintiffs who could provide stronger evidence of educational
deprivations might still be able to seek relief in New York courts.
The third state to address an inadequate education claim at the
appellate level is Montana, where the state supreme court had ruled
in a 1989 school financing case that the Montana Constitution
requires "a system of quality public education granting to each
student [] equality of educational opportunity. 1 18 One year after the
school financing case, a family brought a damages suit against a local
school system in Hayworth v. School District No. 19,119 arguing that
school officials had violated their children's constitutional right to an
education by failing to provide a safe learning environment. 20 The
court rejected the claim based on Montana's sovereign immunity
statute, which bars claims for damages, and distinguished the earlier
school financing case on the grounds that it had sought a form of
relief that was not barred by the statute.'2' Although an earlier
Montana opinion had suggested that educational malpractice claims
might be recognized in the state, the court indicated that under its
current interpretation of sovereign immunity, claims seeking damages
from local schools would not be allowed under any legal theory."
117. This interpretation is supported by another passage in which the court compared
the plaintiffs' case to Johnpoll v. Elias, 513 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). See Bennett, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 79. Johnpoll, decided prior to the Nyquist school financing case, involved a
student who had been classified as both talented and gifted and handicapped and who
claimed that he had been deprived of a "'decent education.'" Johnpoll, 513 F. Supp. at
430-31 (quoting a memo by the plaintiff). The boy's father sought a preliminary
injunction to allow his son to attend the high school of his choice, but the district court
held that disallowing school choice did not deny the right to an education. See id. at 431-
32. Similarly, the Bennett court reasoned, "the fact [that the plaintiff's daughter] is not
being permitted to attend the educational program of her choice is not a denial of her
constitutional right to an education." Bennett, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 79. Again, this language
implies that an enforceable right exists, but that it was not violated in the case.
118. Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989). The
Montana court held that the constitutional provision is binding on all branches of
government at all levels, including individual school districts. See id.
119. 795 P.2d 470 (Mont. 1990).
120. See id at 471. The children had social problems that led to frequent fights with
their peers. The plaintiffs removed their children from school and sued on both
constitutional and negligence theories. See id.
121. See id. at 473 (noting that the school financing case had sought a declaratory
judgment). The statute provides immunity from damages claims against "governmental
entities" for acts or omissions by their "legislative bodies" and members, officers, and
agents of those bodies. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-11 (1997). The court held that the
defendant school officials were agents of the school board, a legislative body. See
Hayworth, 795 P.2d at 472.
122. See Hayworth, 795 P.2d at 473 (discussing B.M. v. State ("B.M. I"), 649 P.2d 425,
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Taken together, the cases from Washington, New York, and
Montana suggest that state courts generally will be cautious about
enforcing the constitutional right to an adequate education against
local school systems. To discourage such claims if not bar them
outright, state courts may require evidence of serious educational
deprivation" or invoke sovereign immunity statutes.24 Nevertheless,
these meager precedents suggest that plaintiffs who can show more
than low test scores or lack of enrichment programs may be able to
bring claims for failure to provide an adequate education, particularly
if they seek a remedy other than damages.'2
Moreover, it may be significant that these cases came from states
where the school financing decisions neither established detailed
judicial standards to define an adequate education nor declared
education to be a fundamental right. 6 In handling subsequent cases,
these courts had broad discretion to define individual students' rights
against local schools. As discussed in Part I, however, many of the
more recent school finance decisions not only have provided detailed
adequacy definitions, but also have declared as fundamental the right
to a quality education. 27 By locking themselves into strict scrutiny
analysis, such courts may have curtailed their freedom of
427 (Mont. 1982) (plurality opinion)). B.M. I is the only court opinion to suggest that
educational malpractice might be a cognizable cause of action. See Sellers v. School Bd. of
Manassas, 960 F. Supp. 1006, 1014 & n.34 (E.D. Va. 1997) (discussing the history of
educational malpractice litigation and noting that the Montana courts are the only ones
that have not explicitly barred such claims). The Montana court held that school officials
owed a duty to the plaintiff based on statutes governing the testing and placement of
special education students, but the plaintiff lost upon remand. See B.M. v. State ("B.M.
II"), 698 P.2d 399, 400-401 (Mont. 1985) (upholding summary judgment against the
plaintiff because she had failed to raise an issue of material fact as to actual injury). In
light of the statement in Hayworth regarding sovereign immunity, it appears that Montana
courts will no longer allow such claims. 795 P.2d at 473.
123. See Ramsdell v. North River Sch. Dist. No. 200, 704 P.2d 606, 609 (Wash. 1985)
(en banc).
124. See Hayworth, 795 P.2d at 473.
125. See Ramsdell, 704 P.2d at 609; cf. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (involving a plaintiff who had been allowed to
graduate from high school despite reading at a fifth-grade level); Hoffman v. Board of
Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317,318-19 (N.Y. 1979) (involving a plaintiff with a speech impediment
who had been misdiagnosed as having a mental handicap for 13 years). For a more
detailed discussion of damages and other remedies, see infra Parts III.B, IV.B.
126. See Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989); Board
of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585
P.2d 71, 94-95 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text
(discussing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1). The New York courts did not explain what a "sound
basic education" entailed until 10 years after Bennett was decided. See Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995).
127. See supra notes 88, 91 and accompanying text.
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interpretation in future cases."2 Part III discusses this issue in more
depth, outlining possible constitutional causes of action both in states
that have declared the right to an adequate education to be
fundamental and in those states that have not.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS BASED ON THE FAILURE TO
EDUCATE ADEQUATELY
Although it has received little attention in school financing cases,
the strategy of suing local schools for failure to provide an adequate
education based on constitutional grounds is not new. New York
courts rejected a constitutional claim in one of the country's first
educational malpractice cases, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
School District,2 9 although subsequent cases focused mainly on
negligence theories. 30  Likewise, educational malpractice
commentators have devoted the bulk of their attention to negligence
theories, but several have suggested that states may have a
constitutional duty to provide an adequate education as a quid pro
quo for depriving students of liberty through compulsory attendance
128. See infra Part III.A.
129. 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979); see also supra notes 112-14 and accompanying
text (discussing Donohue and noting that it was decided before the New York courts
recognized a constitutional right to a sound basic education).
130. The popularity of negligence theories may be due to the fact that the Donohue
court acknowledged an educational malpractice claim "might ... state a cause of action
within traditional notions of tort law." 391 N.E.2d at 1354. The court rejected the claim
because it did not want to adjudicate school policies and their day-to-day implementation,
but subsequent cases have tended to stick to malpractice theories and contract claims
when private schools or universities are parties. See supra notes 4, 6-8 (discussing cases).
The only educational malpractice case in the country to recognize a duty toward
students cited its state constitution as an example of general education policy, but
appeared to base its holding on state statutory grounds. See B.M. v. State ("B.M. I"), 649
P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982) (plurality opinion) (citing MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1, but
describing the complaint as alleging that "the school district failed to follow the statutory
and regulatory policies governing the placement of students in the special education
program"); see also Hayworth v. School Dist. No. 19, 795 P.2d 470, 473 (Mont. 1990)
(concluding that damages claims against schools are now barred in Montana by sovereign
immunity); supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (discussing Hayworth and B.M. 1).
At least two other cases have raised constitutional issues. See Carlson v. Midway R-I Sch.
Dist., No. 91-0702-CV-W-6, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10602, at *6-7 (W.D. Mo. July 25,
1994) (rejecting a constitutional claim as "more akin to a form of educational
malpractice," but stating that it was not "inconceivable" that it would be a sound theory of
duty under some fact patterns); Agostine v. School Dist. of Phila., 527 A.2d 193, 195 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987) (rejecting a common law claim "derived from the Commonwealth's
Constitution" based in part on Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979), a school
financing case holding that students have no right to a particular level of educational
quality).
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laws. 3' Two of these commentators, both writing before the third
wave of school financing cases gathered momentum, concluded that
state constitutions' education provisions also could provide a basis for
individual claims against local schools. 132
These sources and traditional constitutional law analyses suggest
three causes of action under which families could seek relief for
violations of the constitutional right to an adequate education:
substantive due process, equal protection, and constitutional tort
claims. Substantive due process and equal protection claims appear
most promising in states where the right to an adequate education has
been declared fundamental and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 3
The third possible avenue of relief, so-called "constitutional tort"
claims, would seek recognition of a cause of action based directly on a
131. See, e.g., Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A Tort En Ventre, 39 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 323, 339-42 (1991); Richard Funston, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of
Action in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743, 766-71 (1981); James S.
Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal
Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 405-13
(1990); Ratner, supra note 59, at 823-28; Thomas G. Eschweiler, Comment, Educational
Malpractice in Sex Education, 49 SMU L. REv. 101, 103 (1995); Charles M. Masner, Note,
Educational Malpractice and a Right to Education: Should Compulsory Education Laws
Require a Quid Pro Quo?, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 555, 565-79 (1982); Patricia Wright
Morrison, Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REv.
796, 796-810 (1975). The quid pro quo argument draws on federal cases holding that
patients who have been involuntarily confined in mental hospitals are entitled to
minimally adequate training to justify their confinement. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 316-19 (1982). Commentators have recognized that there are difficulties in
applying these precedents to educational cases: the patients in the federal litigation were
confined 24 hours per day, whereas the infringement upon students' liberty is much less
severe. See Aquila, supra, at 342; Masner, supra, at 575; Morrison, supra, at 808.
Moreover, because the cases measured treatment in terms of whether certain procedures
were followed rather than whether the patients made progress, some commentators have
suggested that they are inapposite to educational malpractice claims. See Funston, supra,
at 770; Masner, supra, at 575; Morrison, supra, at 808.
132. See Liebman, supra note 131, at 406; Ratner, supra note 59, at 814-29.
Professor Liebman concluded that claims based on state constitutions' education
provisions were promising, but suggested that equal protection claims might be more
difficult because courts might be reluctant to declare education a fundamental right. See
Liebman, supra note 131, at 420-27 (citing second-wave school financing cases). However,
the recent third-wave decisions holding that students have a fundamental right to an
adequate education appear to have overcome this barrier. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text. Gershon M. Ratner, a former deputy executive secretary at the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, analyzed state constitutional education
provisions and concluded that they could be interpreted as establishing a duty to educate
effectively. See Ratner, supra note 59, at 814-22 (citing second-wave cases). But see
McUsic, supra note 29, at 309 & n.4 (criticizing Ratner's analysis). Ratner also outlined
federal and state equal protection theories. See Ratner, supra note 59, at 828-51; see also
infra Part IlI.A (discussing such theories in more detail).
133. See infra Part III.A.
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state constitution's education provision.TM
A. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
Substantive due process and equal protection are the traditional
constitutional theories used to protect individual rights-particularly
fundamental rights-from government intrusion.13 5 In adjudicating
these claims, state courts often rely heavily on federal constitutional
law,136 both because it is better developed 37 and because state courts
face considerable pressure to legitimize their decisions by
harmonizing them with federal precedents.138 Thus, although courts
may interpret state constitutions as providing more extensive rights
than the Federal Constitution,39 federal case law often "casts a
134. See infra Part III.B.
135. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.7 (5th
ed. 1995). As discussed in Part I, equal protection claims focus on government actions that
treat groups differently based on their status as minorities or in ways that infringe upon
members' fundamental rights. See supra note 34. Substantive due process claims, in
contrast, focus on whether the government has the constitutional authority to take certain
actions at all. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7 (2d
ed. 1988). Although the two claims are conceptually distinct, the federal courts apply
strict scrutiny analysis under both theories to protect fundamental rights. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (substantive due process); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630-32 (1969) (equal protection).
136. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1136 (1999); Ratner, supra note 59,
at 829 n.215; Williams, supra note 48, at 1197; Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's
Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L.
REV. 353, 354-62 (1984); Note, Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1326-31 (1982) [hereinafter Developments
in the Law].
137. See Ratner, supra note 59, at 829 n.215 (discussing equal protection).
138. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 174-85 (1998);
Williams, supra note 136, at 354-56. A few judges have suggested that state courts should
only deviate from Supreme Court precedents when there are textual differences between
federal and state provisions, unique legislative histories, or other specific differences. See
State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring). But see
Williams, supra note 136, at 388-89 (arguing that such criteria should not limit state courts'
ability to conduct independent constitutional analyses). Even when "state-specific"
factors are present, many state courts still resolve fundamental rights claims by referencing
federal constitutional law. See Developments in the Law, supra note 136, at 1400-01
(speech rights), 1459-60 (education and privacy rights).
139. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977) (urging state courts to develop their
constitutions as an independent source of liberties). States' declarations of rights predate
their federal counterpart and were thought by the original framers to be sufficient to
protect citizens from tyranny. See id. at 501; Developments in the Law, supra note 136, at
1327. People did not rely upon the Federal Constitution to protect rights until most of the
Federal Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. However, state
constitutions can expand the level of protection and the roster of rights recognized under
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shadow" over state litigation.40
As the following discussion will show, however, relying on
federal jurisprudence in dealing with affirmative constitutional duties
to provide government services is problematic because of the federal
courts' underlying assumptions about the nature of constitutional
rights and violations.' 41 Prior state court precedents are also of
limited use in determining whether schools have provided students
with an adequate education. 42 In dealing with the right to an
adequate education, state courts are entering new territory and may
need to develop new analyses to adjudicate constitutional claims. 143
1. The Baseline: Federal Courts
As discussed in Part I, federal courts have held that legislation
that infringes upon a fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest. 44 Statutes that do not
infringe upon fundamental rights, however, will be upheld "if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts" that would justify the
action as a rational means of achieving a legitimate government
interest.145 In the context of government provision of public services,
federal case law. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword. State Courts and the Strategic
Space Between Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985);
Developments in the Law, supra note 136, at 1328-34.
140. See Williams, supra note 136, at 355-56. Many commentators argue that because
state courts do not face federalism concerns, they may interpret identical constitutional
provisions differently from federal precedent. See Brennan, supra note 139, at 502;
Williams, supra note 136, at 397-401; Developments in the Law, supra note 136, at 1348.
141. See infra Part III.A.1.
142. See infra Part III.A.2.
143. See infra Part III.A.3.
144. See supra note 35. Some commentators have described strict scrutiny as " 'strict'
in theory but fatal in fact," but this appears accurate only in describing cases dealing with
suspect classifications. TRIE, supra note 135, § 16-6 (quoting Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword." In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). Though
rare, federal courts have upheld infringements upon fundamental rights. See, e.g., Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (upholding federal ceilings on campaign contributions);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 155, 163-64 (1973) (upholding state bans on abortions after
the second trimester). See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental
Interests: An Essential but Underanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L.
Rnv. 917 (1988) (cataloging cases discussing compelling government interests).
145. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see also Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) ("[T]his Court will assume that
the objectives articulated by the legislature are actual purposes of the statute, unless an
examination of the circumstances forces us to conclude that they 'could not have been a
goal of the legislation.' " (quoting Weinberger v. Weinsenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16
(1975))). Federal courts make an exception, however, when the government action treats
people differently based on a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classification, thereby raising
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the courts sometimes apply a variation of the rational relation test
and will intervene only when there is such a substantial departure
from professional norms as to demonstrate that the decisionmaker
did not exercise professional judgment.'46
Before mechanically applying these tests to the right to an
adequate education, however, it is important to note that the federal
courts have developed these analyses in the context of several core
assumptions about the Federal Constitution. First, federal courts
have assumed that constitutional rights are "negative rights"-that is,
that the rights guarantee that the government will not act in a way
that interferes with certain protected private activities such as voting,
travel, or speech, but do not require the government to act
affirmatively to help individuals exercise such rights.14 7 While this
equal protection concerns and triggering strict or heightened scrutiny. See supra note 34.
146. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217, 225 (1985)
(applying the professional services analysis to a decision to dismiss the plaintiff from a
medical education program); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1982) (applying
the professional services analysis to treatment provided to involuntarily committed mental
patients). In Ewing, the plaintiff alleged that early dismissal for failing a critical
competency test violated his "property" interest in continued enrollment in a university
medical program. The Court held that even if there was such a property right, only a
substantial departure from academic norms as to demonstrate that the decisionmaker did
not exercise professional judgment would warrant judicial overturning of such "genuinely
academic decisions." Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225. However, the Court never actually ruled
that there was a substantive due process right involved in the case. See id. at 229 (Powell
J., concurring) (concluding that no such right existed); see also Board of Curators of the
Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (alleging a procedural due process
violation on a similar fact pattern).
147. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 182, 196
(1989) (holding that the right to be free from bodily harm does not include the right to
government protection); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983)
(holding that the right to free speech does not include right to public funding for groups
involved in political lobbying); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,316 (1980) (holding that the
right to abortion does not include the right to public funding); Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973) (holding that the rights to vote and to free speech do
not include the right to education services). The Seventh Circuit has been particularly
forceful in articulating the negative rights theory, especially with reference to the framers'
intent. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote the
Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people but
that it might do too much to them." (citations omitted)). But cf Steven J. Heyman, The
First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1991
DUKE L.J. 507, 546-71 (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
to create a constitutional right to protection).
Critics and even some supporters of the negative rights theory point out that the
Constitution includes some affirmative language and rights. See David P. Currie, Positive
and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864, 887 (1986) (identifying
positive federal rights and concluding that the interpretation of the Constitution as a
charter of negative liberties is a valuable and generally valid insight, but not a talisman).
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theory has been hotly debated by scholars 4 and subject to occasional
exception by the Supreme Court itself,14 9 federal courts consistently
have rejected general claims of entitlement to government services
based on substantive due process and equal protection theories. 150
Instead, they have reasoned that because the government has no duty
to act in the first place, there generally is no constitutional violation
The Sixth Amendment, for instance, requires speedy and impartial trials, confrontation of
witnesses, compulsory process, and assistance of counsel for criminal defendants. See U.S.
CON T. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (recognizing an
affirmative right to trial counsel for indigent criminal defendants). The Due Process
Clauses themselves arguably impose an affirmative duty to afford fair procedures before
depriving people of life, liberty, or property. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:
A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2312 (1990); Currie, supra, at 872.
148. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 147, passim; Peter B. Edelman, Essay, The Next
Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 24-25
(1987); Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 731, 756-62 (1997); Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
RnV. 1293, passim (1984); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-
Foreword- On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 7, 13-19 (1969); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable
Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependency, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 333-
35 (1985); Martha Christine Foley, Note, Hospitalization Requirements for Second
Trimester Abortions: For the Purpose of Health or Hindrance?, 71 GEO. L.J. 991, 1009
n.100 (1983).
149. The first major exception involves rights to judicial process for indigent parties
when fundamental rights or "severe forms of state action" are at stake. M.L.B. v. S.LJ.,
519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (right to fee waiver in appeal of termination of parental rights);
see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974) (no right to counsel for discretionary
criminal appeals); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (no right to fee waiver in
bankruptcy case); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (right to fee waiver
in divorce); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354, 357-58 (1963) (right to attorney for
appeal of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (right to free trial transcript
for criminal conviction appeal). The second group of cases involves plaintiffs who are in
state custody through imprisonment or incarceration. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
316-17 (right to treatment for involuntarily committed patients); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817 (1977) (right to legal materials and access to the courts for prisoners); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (right to medical care for prisoners). The Supreme Court and
some commentators have suggested that the state's duty to act in such cases exists only
because the government already has taken affirmative action by depriving individuals of
their liberty. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200; Currie, supra note 147, at 874. But see
Bandes, supra note 147, at 2295-96 (arguing that dependence on the state should create a
duty regardless of whether the party has been deprived of liberty). Even when the
government does assume such duties, the courts may apply a low standard of care. See
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (holding that medical malpractice does not become an Eighth
Amendment violation simply because the victim was a prisoner); supra note 146 and
accompanying text (explaining holdings that courts will intervene in the provision of
professional services only when the facts indicate that no professional judgment was used).
150. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (no right to protective services); Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 33 (no right to education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no right
to housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970) (no right to welfare).
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when it decides voluntarily to provide public services but then fails to
do so in a reasonable manner.'
The second core assumption, based in part on the language of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses themselves, 52 is that the
constitutional limitations only apply to government actions. 53 In the
absence of "state action," courts generally have held that there can be
no substantive due process or equal protection violation even if
private actors or general social conditions severely infringe upon
individuals' constitutional rights." Even when government
involvement has been extensive, the federal courts have often applied
a narrow definition of state action and have focused only on
affirmative acts. 5 Thus, as long as the government does not actively
and directly infringe on a plaintiff's rights, there generally is no
constitutional violation even if a government omission leads to a
substantial infringement upon a constitutional right. 56
151. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-200; Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223
(7th Cir. 1988) (911 dispatch); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1448 (7th Cir. 1984)
(firefighting services); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d at 1206 (police services).
152. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphasis added)).
153. Soon after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held
that it did not apply to private actors, see, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883), but later broadened its definition of "state action" to include some public-private
entanglements. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 135, §§ 12.1-.5 (discussing the
evolution of the definition of "state action").
154. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 718-20 (1974) (refusing to enforce
court-ordered desegregation plans when segregation was caused by housing patterns and
other societal factors); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 135, § 12.4(d) (citing cases
distinguishing between de jure and de facto school segregation as a classic example of the
state action doctrine). Nevertheless, the Court has strained the state action doctrine to its
limits in voting rights cases. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 540, 568 (1964)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause is violated where demographic changes rather
than state action caused voting district populations to become uneven); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (striking down a whites-only unofficial primary election under the
Fifteenth Amendment despite the lack of a formal state connection).
155. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. DeShaney involved a four-year-old boy
whom a social services agency monitored for two years because of reports of abuse by his
father. Although the agency had ordered the boy taken into temporary custody, released
him back to his father, and made repeated visits during which social workers noted signs of
abuse, the Court concluded that the government played no part in the dangers he faced.
Returning the boy to his father's custody "placed him in no worse position than in which
he would have been had it not acted at all," the Court reasoned, so private action-not
state action-infringed on the boy's right to be free from bodily harm. Id.
156. See id; TRIBE, supra note 135, § 16-1 n.21 (describing federal courts' traditional
reluctance to redress disadvantages or injuries not thought to be "actively engineered" by
the government itself). This doctrine finds some support in the common law, which holds
defendants liable for misfeasance that creates new risks of harm, but not for nonfeasance
that makes situations no worse. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
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By defining constitutional rights as negative and state action as
discrete and affirmative, federal courts have greatly restricted the
focus of substantive due process and equal protection claims. They
generally do not apply either the strict scrutiny or the rational
relation tests to government omissions or negligence occurring in the
course of providing ongoing public services because such claims
usually do not involve "constitutional rights" or "state action" as
federal courts have defined the terms.157 Instead, courts only use the
strict scrutiny and rational relation tests to evaluate deliberate,
official state actions that either penalize or directly restrict protected
private activities. Accordingly, federal case law provides little
guidance in evaluating substantive due process and equal protection
claims based on the right to an adequate education because it
suggests that the government has no obligation to provide services, let
alone to provide services at a given level of quality.159
2. States' Struggle with Positive Rights
Many states have adopted the federal strict scrutiny and rational
relation tests in their substantive due process and equal protection
analyses despite the fact that their constitutions differ considerably
from the federal model160 Unlike the United States Constitution,
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984). Even the common law, however, treats
inaction as misconduct when an omission occurs during an ongoing course of action. See
id. ("Failure to blow a whistle or to shut off steam, although in itself inaction, is readily
treated as negligent operation of a train, which is affirmative misconduct."). Thus, some
scholars have criticized the federal courts for relying too much on rigid distinctions
between action and inaction, particularly in cases involving the ongoing provision of public
services. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 147, at 2285-97. For a broad discussion of the state
action doctrine and its critiques, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw.
U. L. REV. 503 (1985); William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking
"Rethinking" State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 558 (1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, More is
Not Less: A Rejoinder to Professor Marshall, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 571, 572 (1985).
157. See supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-32 (1969) (penalty for travel);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (direct restriction on voting);
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 135, § 12.1 ("When a legislature, executive officer, or a
court takes some official action against an individual, that action is subjected to review
under the Constitution, for the official act of any governmental agency is direct
governmental action and therefore subject to the restraints of the Constitution."); TRIBE,
supra note 135, § 16-7 (explaining that equal protection analysis is used to protect against
inequalities that "impinge directly on access to, or levels of" fundamental rights and
against inequalities that deter or penalize the exercise of other independent rights);
Bandes, supra note 147, at 2297 (discussing the Court's "preoccupation with state actions
which are not only affirmative in the traditional sense, but physically tangible").
159. See supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
160. See Williams, supra note 48, at 1221-22. With equal protection, for instance, a
number of courts follow federal case law directly; the rest either apply the federal
[Vol. 78
EDUCATION RIGHTS
many state constitutions use positive phrasing to describe core rights
and government services. This affirmative language creates a much
stronger textual basis for arguing that state governments have a duty
to provide support for needy citizens, public education, and other
basic services' 6' and even that constitutional requirements apply to
private actors.162  While many courts have interpreted state
constitutional provisions concerning government services as merely
aspirational or advisory," some have held that such provisions create
judicially enforceable positive rights. 64 Scholars have argued that
framework of analysis, but do so independently, or reject the federal hierarchy in favor of
other means-ends and balancing tests. Some states have used different methods in
different cases. See id. at 1219-21. One area where state supreme courts have deviated
significantly from their federal counterparts is in judicial review of economic legislation,
where they continue to strike down laws based on both substantive due process and equal
protection claims. See Developments in the Law, supra note 136, at 1463-93. The federal
courts, in contrast, largely abandoned the field to legislative discretion in the 1930s. See
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 135, §§ 11.3-.4.
161. For instance, more than a third of the states have constitutional provisions
explicitly mandating public assistance for the poor. See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88; CAL.
CONST. art. 16, §§ 3, 11, art. 34; HAw. CONST. art. IX, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. X, § 1; IND.
CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. 7, § 4; LA. CONST. art. 12, § 8; MIss. CONST. art.
XIV, § 262; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3 cl.3; NEv. CONST. art. 13, § 1; N.M. CONST. art.
IX, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. 17, § 3;
TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 18. All 50
states have constitutional provisions regarding public education. See supra note 47. For a
sampling of substantive provisions on shelter and other topics, see Burt Neuborne,
Foreword State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881,
893-95 (1989). For a discussion of state courts that have ruled that their constitutions
create an enforceable right to a healthful environment, see generally Mary Ellen Cusack,
Comment, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a Healthful
Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 173 (1993).
162. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 345 (Cal. 1979)
(holding based on broad, affirmative constitutional language that the right to free speech
applies in private shopping centers).
163. See, e.g., Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 755-58 (Conn. 1995) (cataloging cases
across the country that have refused to recognize a constitutional right to welfare);
Graber, supra note 148, at 789-93 (same).
164. See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive
Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 1057, 1077-82 (1993) (citing the school financing cases as the largest example of this
trend). Several state courts also have struck down abortion funding restrictions either on
equal protection or due process grounds. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 798 (Cal. 1981) (substantive due process); Moe v. Secretary
of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981) (substantive due process); Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (NJ. 1982) (equal protection); Williams, In the
Supreme Court's Shadow, supra note 136, at 364-65 (discussing cases). Also, at least two
state courts have recognized a positive constitutional right to welfare. See Butte
Community Union v. Harris, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Mont. 1986) (applying heightened but
not strict scrutiny to an equal protection claim against a state welfare program); Tucker v.
Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1977) (recognizing an affirmative, substantive duty to
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such holdings are warranted not only by the positive constitutional
language, but also by the fact that state courts and constitutions are
tied more closely to the electorate than their federal counterparts. 165
Most of the cases dealing with positive fights have focused on the
plaintiffs' access to the services or benefits in question. The abortion
funding cases, for instance, have focused on state statutes that denied
participants access to medical benefits.1 Most welfare cases have
focused on eligibility standards and whether different groups of
recipients received equal treatment.1 67  Similarly, states that
recognized education as a fundamental right in early school financing
cases have encountered later challenges over when schools can deny
access to education programs by expelling students or restricting
transportation.16 In West Virginia,169 for instance, the state's highest
court has held that schools generally must provide free alternative
provide assistance to the needy). Judicial recognition of positive rights, however,
occasionally has proven so unpopular that states have amended their constitutions to
negate the rulings. See, e.g., Butte, 712 P.2d at 1313 (subjecting welfare services to
heightened scrutiny); Graber, supra note 148, at 791 n.343 (describing a subsequent
constitutional amendment designed to overturn Butte).
165. Specifically, state courts have a stronger tradition of generating law, more
flexibility to adapt to local budgets and priorities, and stronger democratic credentials
than federal courts because of explicit provisions authorizing judicial review, state judicial
elections, and the relative ease of amending state constitutions. See Hershkoff, supra note
136, at 1155-69; Neuborne, supra note 161, at 896-900. State courts do, however, face
concerns about separation of powers, particularly in decisions requiring expenditures by
other branches. See Feldman, supra note 164, at 1060.
166. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights, 625 P.2d at 780; Moe, 417
N.E.2d at 390; Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 927.
167. See, e.g., Minino v. Perales, 589 N.E.2d 385, 386 (N.Y. 1992) (mem.) (exclusion of
aliens); Lee v. Smith, 373 N.E.2d 247, 248 (N.Y. 1977) (program that provided less aid to
the elderly, disabled, and blind than to other recipients); Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 450 (rules
forbidding aid to people under 21 except under narrow circumstances).
168. See, e.g., Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep't of Educ., 825 P.2d 438, 439
(Cal. 1992) (upholding a statute allowing fees to be charged for transportation); Kennedy
v. Board of Educ., 337 S.E.2d 905, 907-08 (W. Va. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that denial
of transportation to two students living on a road in poor condition violated equal
protection because it kept them from exercising their fundamental right to education).
The Kennedy case involved two students with physical handicaps who could not walk to a
designated bus stop on a main road. See id. However, the court decided the case based on
equal protection grounds without reference to federal special education laws. See id.
169. As discussed supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text, the West Virginia school
financing decision Pauley v. Kelly held both that education was a fundamental right and
that the state constitution required the provision of a high-quality education. 255 S.E.2d
859, 878 (1979). To date, however, the subsequent appellate cases have focused on
fundamental rights analysis without involving quality claims. The Supreme Court has
heard one case in which a suspended student received only four hours of alternative
education per week, but it did not rule on the adequacy of the education because the
plaintiff had not appealed a lower court ruling on the issue. See Cathe A. v. Doddridge
County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340,349 (W. Va. 1997).
432 [Vol. 78
EDUCATION RIGHTS
education for students who are placed on long-term suspension for
bringing weapons to school.170 The court acknowledged that schools
have a compelling interest in maintaining a safe environment for
students, but held that long-term suspensions without alternative
programs were not narrowly tailored to achieve such interests.' 71
Applying strict scrutiny to disciplinary measures could have
serious consequences for public schools,172 but the analysis used in
such cases and in the welfare rights and abortion funding litigation
still fits fairly well within the traditional federal framework.' The
courts are still focusing on formal government actions that directly
interfere with individuals' private activities-only in these cases, the
private activities at issue happen to be attending classes, obtaining
certain types of health care, or cashing government benefit checks
rather than exercising traditional rights such as expressing political
views or traveling across state lines.'7 4 Such fact patterns have not
required the courts to determine what quality and quantity of services
must be provided to satisfy the affirmative constitutional guarantees
or to analyze government omissions and negligence-rather than
170. See Cathe A., 490 S.E.2d at 349; Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Bd. of
Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 916 (W. Va. 1996); see also Magyar v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist.,
958 F. Supp. 1423, 1443 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding that a school system must provide
alternative education to an expelled child to avoid infringing upon his fundamental right
to education under the Arizona Constitution as well as to satisfy federal special education
laws). See generally Roni R. Reed, Note, Education and the State Constitutions:
Alternatives for Suspended and Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582 (1996)
(arguing prior to the West Virginia and Arizona cases that strict scrutiny analysis would
require schools to provide alternative programs for suspended and expelled students in
states that have recognized education as a fundamental right).
171. See Phillip Leon M., 484 S.E.2d at 914. In 1997, the court modified its ruling to
allow schools to deny education temporarily in extreme circumstances upon a strong
showing of necessity, such as where the safety of others is threatened. See Cathe A., 490
S.E.2d at 350-51.
172. See Reed, supra note 170, at 582-83 (concluding that strict scrutiny analysis would
require schools to provide alternative education for all suspended and expelled students).
This prospect has convinced at least one state court to narrow the scope of its school
financing decision to avoid making education a fundamental right. In Massachusetts, the
high court held in a 1993 school financing case that the state constitution imposed an
enforceable duty on legislators and executive branch officials to provide education for all
children enrolled in the public schools. See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office
of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993). Two years later, the court held that student
disciplinary procedures should be evaluated under a rational relation test, declining to
declare education a fundamental right for fear that school officials would have to pass
strict-scrutiny analysis any time they suspended a student for safety reasons. See Doe v.
Superintendent of Schs., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095-96 (Mass. 1995).
173. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 147 and
accompanying text (discussing the federal view that constitutional rights are negative and
only guarantee citizens freedom from government interference with certain activities).
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deliberate state action-resulting in violations of the constitutional
standards. The handful of cases focusing on these latter issues suggest
that state courts are extremely uncomfortable with having to define
the scope of constitutional duties to provide public services.
In the New York case Bernstein v. Toia, for example, the
plaintiffs challenged the sufficiency of state housing assistance just a
few months after New York's highest court had held that the state
constitution created "an affirmative duty to aid the needy. '176 The
Bernstein court responded to the housing challenge by defining the
right to public assistance in negative terms. The opinion held that the
state constitution forbade the legislature from impermissibly
excluding the needy from benefit programs, but refused to restrict the
legislature's discretion in determining the amount of aid.177
Concluding that the constitution did not require the state to meet "in
full measure all the legitimate needs of each recipient," the court
upheld the housing assistance program under a traditional rational
relation analysis.178 In effect, the New York court was able to make
the problem go away by reverting to the traditional conception of
negative rights.
A few isolated state court decisions have been more generous in
construing the positive nature of the right to education and have
required government officials to take affirmative action to protect
that right. The California Supreme Court, for instance, held in Butt v.
State179 that state officials must take over a financially troubled school
system in order to prevent infringements upon students' fundamental
rights to education.' State officials argued that their constitutional
duties ended once they delivered the district's share of money under
California's equalized financing plan, which had been developed to
meet the requirements of the state's earlier school financing cases.18 1
Yet, although the district's $29.5 million deficit was not the state's
fault, the court held that state officials were not released from their
obligations because education is a fundamental right under the state
175. 373 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1977).
176. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449,452 (N.Y. 1977).
177. See Bernstein, 373 N.E.2d at 244.
178. lI; see also Hershkoff, supra note 136, at 1150-51 (noting a few lower court
decisions that have examined the substantive adequacy of the benefit provided, but
concluding that Bernstein is the dominant holding in New York case law).
179. 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
180. See id at 1251.
181. See Serrano v. Priest ("Serrano II"), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v.
Priest ("Serrano I"), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971).
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constitution.1' When a local district's financial problems otherwise
would deny students "basic educational equality," the court reasoned,
the state is required to step in unless it can demonstrate a compelling
reason for not doing so."8s
In a 1996 case, Sheff v. O'Neill,'" the Connecticut Supreme
Court also concluded that state officials could be held liable for
failure to act, holding that racial and ethnic isolation in Hartford's
schools violated students' fundamental rights to education."as The
defendants based their defense on traditional constitutional theory,
arguing that there had been no state action because the demographic
patterns at issue had been caused by housing and other societal
factors beyond their control.8 6 The Connecticut court rejected this
argument, emphasizing its earlier school financing holding that the
state constitution created an affirmative duty to provide students with
a "substantially equal" educational opportunity.187 It concluded that
"if the legislature fails, for whatever reason, to take action to remedy
substantial inequalities in the educational opportunities that such
children are being afforded, its actions and its omissions constitute
state action" that can be reviewed under equal protection analysis.1 88
Ultimately, the court held for the plaintiffs under a modified strict
scrutiny test,"9 relying in part on an unusually worded constitutional
182. See Butt, 842 P.2d at 1256.
183. See id. Although the California courts traditionally have relied on equality
arguments in dealing with the right to education, at least one observer has suggested that
Butt implicitly applied an adequacy standard because it required the state to give the
district a disproportionate share of state funds to ensure that students' education would
meet certain minimal expectations. See Enrich, supra note 10, at 114.
184. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
185. See id. at 1270. In 1991-92, 92.4% of Hartford students were members of minority
groups, compared to 25.7% of Connecticut students as a whole. See id. at 1287. That year,
94% of Hartford sixth graders failed to meet state mathematics goals, 80% failed reading
standards, and 97% failed writing goals. See id at 1294 (Berdon, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 1276. Except for a brief period in 1868, the State of Connecticut had
never deliberately assigned students to schools based on their race. The state had
supported plans for increasing interdistrict diversity since the 1970s and had reorganized
its state school board in the 1980s to focus "on the needs of urban school children and to
promote diversity in public schools." Id. at 1274.
187. Id. at 1277 (citing Horton v. Meskill ("Horton I"), 376 A.2d 359, 375 (1977)).
188. Id.
189. The Connecticut court applied a strict scrutiny test to its original school financing
case. See Horton I, 376 A.2d at 374. Eight years later, the court ostensibly upheld the
"strict scrutiny" standard, but implemented a three-stage balancing test. See Horton v.
Meskill ("Horton HI"), 486 A.2d 1099, 1105-06 (Conn. 1985). Under the test, plaintiffs
must prove that the disparities at issue are more than de minimis. The burden then shifts
to the state to prove that the disparities were "incident to the advancement of a legitimate
state policy." Id at 1106. Even if the state meets this burden, however, it can lose if the
disparities are then shown to be so great as to be unconstitutional despite the state's
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provision stating that "[n]o person shall be ... subjected to
segregation."'19 0
While the Connecticut court's unusual anti-segregation provision
and modified form of strict scrutiny analysis may make Sheffs specific
holding unique,191 its discussion of the nature of the affirmative duty
to educate has much broader implications. Both Sheff and Butt
undercut the assumptions and distinctions that permeate traditional
fundamental fights analysis, suggesting that positive fundamental
rights do indeed obligate state governments to act affirmatively to
ensure that individuals receive the services to which they are
entitled.Y2 Failure to perform these duties-or failure to perform
them to the level needed to provide "substantially" or "basically"
equal services to all recipients-can create a constitutional cause of
action. 3 State governments may even have a duty to act to ensure
that barriers not of their own making do not prevent citizens from
receiving the services to which they have a fundamental right.19 4
Notwithstanding the broad language of these opinions, however,
the cases were handed down in very narrow contexts. Unlike the
West Virginia courts, which have applied strict scrutiny analysis to
cases involving individual students who were denied educational
services by local school officials, 95 Sheff and Butt both involved
justifications. See id. The Sheff defendants lost in the last stage. 678 A.2d at 1288-89.
190. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("[No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of
his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin,
sex or physical or mental disability."). Only New Jersey and Hawaii have similarly worded
provisions, and the court found no case law in either state discussing whether the
provisions required states to prevent de facto segregation. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281-82
& n.29 (quoting HAw. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 5).
191. See, e.g., Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth
Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts' Lingering Institutional
Concerns, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1867, 1896-1902 (1998) (portraying Sheff as a fourth wave of
financing reform, but suggesting that it has inherent limitations because of the unique
constitutional wording, its focus on non-financial issues, and concerns about the courts'
legitimacy and institutional capacity to handle such claims).
192. Compare supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (discussing federal cases
concluding that constitutional rights are negative and do not entitle citizens to government
assistance in exercising those rights), with supra notes 179-90 (discussing cases requiring
state governments to act affirmatively to ensure students receive an equal education).
193. Though neither state explicitly had recognized a quality standard in their school
financing decisions, the combination of a positive right and equal protection analysis still
led the courts to conclude that the education in the challenged districts had become too
disparate to pass constitutional muster. See Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1256 (Cal. 1992);
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1289.
194. See Butt, 842 P.2d at 1253; Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1280.
195. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
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lawsuits against state officials over large-scale problems affecting an
entire school district. 96 Neither the Connecticut nor California courts
appear to have enforced these broad affirmative rights theories in
cases brought by individual students. 97 Thus, while these decisions
have taken the first tentative steps toward outlining the scope of
positive fundamental rights, they do not provide a systematic
framework for evaluating individual claims by students against local
educators.
3. Tying It All Together: The Right to an Adequate Education
States that have recognized a constitutional right to an adequate
education in school financing cases' 98 have set themselves apart even
from California, Connecticut, and other states that have declared
196. See Butt, 842 P.2d at 1243; Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1270.
197. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court in 1984 rejected a claim by a
student whose excessive absences prompted school officials to reduce his grades to the
point that he failed three classes. See Campbell v. Board of Educ., 475 A.2d 289, 291
(Conn. 1984). The court held that the school board policy was neither disciplinary nor an
infringement upon equal education opportunity and did not jeopardize the student's
fundamental rights. See id. at 295-96. The Connecticut Supreme Court also has rejected a
claim that state statutes governing special education gave talented and gifted students a
constitutional right to individualized educational programs. See Broadley v. Board of
Educ. of Meriden, 639 A.2d 502,504-05 (Conn. 1994); Roseann G. Padula, Comment, The
Plight of Connecticut's Brightest Students: Broadley v. Meriden Board of Education, 29
CONN. L. REv. 1319, 1350-52 (1997) (suggesting that Connecticut courts are reluctant to
apply their version of strict scrutiny to intradistrict claims and claims by plaintiffs who are
not low-level achievers). The California courts also have been wary of extending strict
scrutiny analysis in the school context. See, e.g., Steffes v. California Interscholastic Fed'n,
222 Cal. Rptr. 355, 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the fundamental right to
education does not include the right to participate in interscholastic athletics).
198. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir.
Ct. 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993)
(holding that Alabama schools must provide "substantially equitable and adequate
educational opportunities"); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211
(Ky. 1989) (holding that the Kentucky Constitution requires that each child be provided
an equal opportunity to obtain an adequate education); McDuffy v. Secretary of the
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (holding that the quality of
education in poor school districts did not meet constitutional standards); Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont II") 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (holding that an
adequate public education is a fundamental right); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359, 368-69 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that the New York Constitution requires the provision of
a "sound basic education"); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336,357,488 S.E.2d 249,261 (1997)
(holding that a "sound basic education" is a fundamental right); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95 (Wash. 1978) (holding that the Washington Constitution requires
the provision of a "basic" education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979)
(holding that the West Virginia Constitution requires "high quality" educational
standards); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1263-64 (Wyo. 1995)
(holding that the constitutional right to receive a "quality" education is judicially
enforceable); supra notes 15, 91 (discussing these and other adequacy cases).
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education to be a fundamental right.199 The adequacy precedents
have held that states have a constitutional obligation to provide a
service and that the service provided must meet a certain substantive
level of quality. Because educational quality depends not just on
school financing, but also on curricula, teaching skills, and general
policies, courts may be asked to extend substantive due process and
equal protection analyses far beyond existing case law focusing on
formal government actions that deny students access to educational
programs. 20  The unique nature of the right to an adequate
education, however, makes it difficult to apply the traditional rational
relation and strict scrutiny tests to constitutional claims. Under either
test, school officials likely would have little problem proving that
their "ends" are either "legitimate" or "compelling" because the
school financing precedents already have established that districts
have an affirmative constitutional duty to provide educational
services.3 1  Traditional formulations of the "means" analyses,
however, would be problematic in adjudicating education cases.
The rational relation test most likely would be applied in states
that have recognized a constitutional, but not fundamental, right to an
adequate education. The traditional rationality standard would
require that educators' actions be a rational or reasonable means of
providing educational services or achieving other legitimate
government interests.2 z  Courts often accept any plausible
explanation for state action under this test,203 upholding actions that
199. See supra Part III.A.2.
200. See Claremont 1, 703 A.2d at 1359 (stating that any government action or inaction
leading to a failure to provide students with an adequate education should be strictly
scrutinized by the courts); cf. Butt, 842 P.2d at 1256 (analyzing a violation of the right to
education caused by a state omission in the face of local mismanagement); Sheff, 678 A.2d
at 1276-77 (analyzing a violation of the right to education caused by a government
omission in the face of societal factors); supra Part III.A.2 (discussing cases involving the
denial of access to education programs).
201. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that states have a compelling government interest in providing education); Phillip
Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 914 (W. Va. 1996) (deriving a
compelling government interest to provide safe schools from a constitutional provision
requiring a "thorough and efficient" system of education); Gottlieb, supra note 144, at 939
(suggesting that federal and state governments may have a compelling interest in
protecting constitutional rights); supra note 198 (listing adequacy precedents).
202. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981)
(declaring that the courts will assume under the rational relation standard that the
specified objectives of a statute are the actual purposes unless the circumstances show that
those objectives could not have been one of the legislature's goals); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178 (1980) (indicating that the courts will accept any
plausible reason for legislative action under the rational relation standard).
203. See, e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 463 n.7.
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are "at least debatable. ' '2°4 Alternately, under the federal courts' test
for cases involving the provision of professional services, courts would
intervene only if an educator's action violated professional norms to
such an extent that it indicated the educator had not used
professional judgment.2 5 Extreme judicial deference, however, seems
inconsistent with the original school financing cases, in which the
courts conducted independent examinations of educational quality
and even developed their own substantive standards.20 6  The
traditional rational relation test also appears at odds with the fact that
providing adequate educational services is not merely a legitimate
exercise of the political branches' power, but is actually a
constitutional mandate under the school financing precedents2 0
Yet while the traditional rational relation test would provide too
little relief, the traditional strict scrutiny test would provide too much.
In addition to requiring courts to conduct an independent evaluation
of state actions rather than to defer to the judgment of the other
branches,208 the traditional standard would require educators to show
that their actions were narrowly tailored to provide an adequate
education or to meet some other compelling government interest.2 9
Defining narrowly tailored means in the education context likely
would be difficult for the courts,210 but the traditional test would
204. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
205. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1982); Regents of the Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,225 (1985); supra note 146 (discussing federal cases involving
the provision of professional services to university students and prisoners).
206. See supra Part I.B.
207. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (discussing adequacy cases and
the nature of states' obligations under the holdings); see also Hershkoff, supra note 136, at
1138 ("[P]ositive rights not only restrain the government's exercise of power, but also
compel its exercise ... to carry out a specific constitutional purpose. Judicial review ...
must serve to ensure that the government is ... moving policy closer to the
constitutionally prescribed end."). Professor Hershkoff, in an article focusing on state
welfare rights, suggests that government officials should bear the burden in positive rights
cases to show that their "means" are likely to achieve the constitutional goal at issue. See
Hershkoff, supra note 136, at 1137. She argues that this standard is justified by the nature
of positive constitutional rights, by the fact that state judges are more accountable to the
electorate than their federal counterparts, by the fact that state constitutions are easily
amended, and by the lack of federalism concerns in state courts. See id. at 1155-69.
208. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-32 (1969); NOwAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 135, § 14.3.
209. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-32; Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Bd. of
Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 914 (W. Va. 1996) (recognizing a compelling government interest in
providing safe schools, but requiring narrowly tailored disciplinary measures to minimize
infringement upon students' fundamental rights to education).
210. Cf. Peter W. v. San Francisco United Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976) (concluding under a reasonable person standard in an educational malpractice
case that "classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care").
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create even larger problems on a theoretical level. The justification
for requiring state actors to use narrowly tailored means is to ensure
that the government minimizes its intrusions on independently
existing private rights2 n If some other means would address the
government's interests without burdening individuals' fundamental
rights, the state actor must use that alternative. In the education
context, however, students' private rights can be exercised only
through state action. 13 The question for the courts would be whether
school officials have done enough to meet their obligation to provide
an adequate education, not whether they could have chosen some
other means of fulfilling their duty. It would make little sense to
punish educators for making reasonable attempts to provide students
with an adequate education simply because their methodology was
not "narrowly tailored" to achieve that goal.214 A similar concern
would arise in applying the narrowly tailored means standard to
define how far schools must go to overcome societal factors, student
misconduct, and other problems that are not of the schools' making,
but that may prevent students from receiving the educational services
to which they are entitled.2 5 Again, reasonable efforts to overcome
such problems would fall short of the constitutional standard.216
In facing such a scenario, courts might be tempted to take the
route outlined in Bernstein v. Toia1 7 and avoid the problem by
211. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-30; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 664-66 (1966); supra notes 144-47.
212. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) ("[I]f there are other,
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected
activities, a State may not choose the way of greater interference.").
213. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 161, at 883 n.12 (describing the difference between
negative and positive rights).
214. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-39 (1973)
(suggesting that the strict scrutiny test is not "sensitive" to the nature of "affirmative and
reformatory" government services).
215. See Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992) (requiring state officials to take
affirmative action to overcome local school mismanagement); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d
1267, 1270-71 (Conn. 1996) (requiring state officials to take affirmative action to
overcome demographic patterns creating racially isolated schools); Phillip Leon M. v.
Greenbrier County Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 916 (W. Va. 1996) (holding that schools
must provide educational services even when students have been suspended for
misconduct); supra Part III.A.2 (discussing these cases).
216. See supra notes 207,212.
217. 373 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1977). As discussed supra in the text accompanying notes
175-78, the Bernstein court cast a previously recognized affirmative constitutional duty to
aid the needy as a traditional, negative right. The court held that the constitutional duty
did not restrict the legislature's discretion in determining the amount of aid, but instead
only forbid the legislature from impermissibly excluding the needy from state programs.
See Bernstein, 373 N.E.2d at 244.
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recasting the right to an adequate education in more traditional,
negative terms. In Mississippi, which is one of only two states to
recognize a right to adequate education in a case that did not focus on
school financing,218 a supreme court justice has begun to advocate for
such an interpretation2 19 Justice Michael P. Mills argues that the
right to educate oneself is inherent, but that the right to receive a free
public education from the state is of a lesser quaity.22 He concludes
that the right to public education can be used as a "shield" to prevent
government interference, but not as a positive right to force the
government to teach?'1
Justice Mills's argument may make sense in the Mississippi
context because that state's cases have focused on when the
government may interfere with students' education by suspending
them from school.' The theory appears seriously at odds, however,
with the school financing cases recognizing a cause of action for
failure to provide an adequate education. 3 In effect, these cases
already have recognized an affirmative duty on the part of state
officials to provide for public schools and have used language that
describes students' rights as entitling them not to a certain level of
218. See Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237,240 (Miss. 1985); see
also Exira Community Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 789, 796 (Iowa 1994)
(recognizing a right to adequate education in a case challenging Iowa's open enrollment
law, which allows families to enroll their children in schools outside the districts in which
they live). Byrd, which involved a due process challenge to a student suspension, was
particularly unusual because it recognized a fundamental right to an adequate education
based on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. 477 So. 2d at 240. The opinion did
not apply a strict scrutiny analysis, however. See id. at 241 (requiring that school
punishments further substantial legitimate interests); see also In re T.H., 681 So. 2d 110,
115-16 (Miss. 1996) (same). The odd posture of the case may have been due to the fact
that the Mississippi Constitution had been modified in 1960 in an attempt to avoid
desegregation by making the establishment of public schools a discretionary function of
the state legislature rather than a "duty." See Michael P. Mills & William Quin II,
Perspective: The Right to a 'Minimally Adequate Education' as Guaranteed by the
Mississippi Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1521, 1526-27 (1998). In 1987, the constitution
was again amended to require that the legislature "shall, by general law, provide for the
establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools upon such conditions and
limitations as the Legislature may prescribe." MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 201. School financing
commentators are divided over the meaning of the new language. Compare Thro, supra
note 23, at 229 (arguing no constitutional right to education has been created), with
McUsic, supra note 29, at 311 n.5 (interpreting the provision as creating an obligation),
and Mills and Quin, supra, at 1527 n.35 (same).
219. See Mills & Quin, supra note 218, at 1527 n.35.
220. See id. at 1527-28.
221. See id. at 1527.
222. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 91, 198.
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funding but to a certain level of substantive education'24 The school
financing holdings establish that students' right to an adequate
education can be denied not just when they are barred from
educational programs, but also when ongoing services do not meet
constitutional quality standards.P Thus, it would seem anomalous
for these courts to reinterpret the right to an adequate education to
bar future challenges to the quality of educational services.
If courts remain consistent to the school financing cases and
recognize an affirmative duty to provide students with an adequate
education, however, it is clear that using the traditional hierarchy of
means-ends tests would be inappropriate. One option would be to
adopt a general interest-balancing test that would weigh the interests
of school officials against the interests of students to determine
whether particular education programs or policies must be provided
in order to meet constitutional adequacy standards. 6  Interest-
224. See id.; see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky.
1989) (striking down not just Kentucky's school financing method, but its entire system of
education as failing to meet constitutional adequacy standards).
225. See supra notes 168-71 (discussing educational access claims), 91, 198 (discussing
adequacy precedents).
226. Cf., e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987) (defining balancing tests as involving a head-to-head
comparison between competing interests); Gottlieb, supra note 144, at 918 n.9 (defining
balancing tests as "comparing the importance of constitutional requirements and
governmental interests, perhaps discounted by the availability of alternative means").
Many commentators see the hierarchy of means-ends tests used in substantive due
process and equal protection analysis as a form of interest balancing. See, e.g., Stephen E.
Gottlieb, Introduction: Overriding Public Values, in PUBLIC VALUES IN
CONSTrTTONAL LAW 1, 4 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) (describing strict scrutiny
analysis as a "form of balancing with a rigorous burden of proof placed on the
government"); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-
Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 805-10 (1995) (discussing heightened
and strict scrutiny analyses as balancing tests). Others argue that the means-ends
hierarchy was intended to limit or eliminate judicial balancing but has evolved to allow the
courts to weigh the parties' interests. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Categorization, Balancing,
and Government Interests, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv, supra, at 241,
242-43 (arguing that traditional strict scrutiny and rational relation analyses use balancing
rhetoric, but are actually categorical approaches because the classification of the
government interest is outcome determinative); id. at 243-46 (arguing that interest
balancing occurs in intermediate scrutiny cases, strict scrutiny decisions upholding
infringements upon fundamental rights, and rational relation analyses striking down
government actions); Aleinikoff, supra, at 969-71 (analyzing the adoption of intermediate
scrutiny in rights cases as a step toward an "overall balancing approach"). The two
analyses clearly overlap, but some balancing cases focus exclusively on the parties'
interests without conducting a separate analysis of the government's means of achieving its
goals. They simply weigh the parties' interests against each other and hold that the most
important interest wins. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982)
(upholding a child pornography criminal statute because the State's interests in restricting
pornographic activities "overwhelmingly outweighs" any expressive interests involved in
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balancing tests have become increasingly common in constitutional
analyses-particularly at the federal level-and are often appealing to
courts because they facilitate consideration of all litigants' interests
and allow a case-by-case analysis of new doctrinal developments. 27
However, the tests also have come under considerable criticism as
being driven by judges' subjective preferences and for failing to
provide clear constitutional doctrines.' 2
Another alternative would be to modify the traditional
substantive due process and equal protection analyses to make them
more sensitive to the nature of positive constitutional rights. By
combining the independent review performed under the strict
scrutiny test 29 with the reasonable or rational means standard, a0 an
"affirmative rational relation test" would avoid many of the pitfalls of
the traditional strict scrutiny and rational relations analyses. The test
would acknowledge the constitutional status and positive nature of
education rights and provide some level of meaningful relief because
courts would be required to make an independent determination of
whether school officials' actions were a reasonable means of fulfilling
their constitutional duty to provide an adequate education.'
However, the test would avoid holding schools liable for providing
services that are reasonably, but not narrowly, tailored to provide an
adequate education. It would also provide a more workable standard
such activities); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (holding that the State must
either show that its actions did not deny the free exercise of religion or that it had a
sufficient interest in compulsory education to outweigh the religious interests of Amish
families in having their children stop attending public schools in the eighth grade);
Aleinikoff, supra, at 946 (noting that some balancing test cases are determined simply by
which party's interest outweighs the other, while other cases attempt to give both parties'
interests their due). In contrast, many cases decided under means-ends tests have
analyzed governmental means in great detail without examining proffered governmental
interests. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85
CAL. L. REV. 297,306-19 (1997) (suggesting that the federal courts have relied heavily on
means analyses to strike down government actions in the last 25 years and arguing that
balancing is often present but unstated in such cases).
227. See Aleinikoff, supra note 226, at 960-61 (discussing the advantages of balancing
tests). For a discussion of the spread of interest-balancing tests at the federal level, see id.
at 965-68 (cataloging federal First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, procedural due
process, and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
228. See, e.g., id. at 972-95 (cataloging criticisms of interest-balancing tests). But see
Gottlieb, supra note 144, at 973-74 (acknowledging that balancing is "impossible to
define" but arguing that alternative forms of analysis use similar methods).
229. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
231. Cf. Hershkoff, supra note 136, at 1137 (arguing that state courts should determine
whether the state action at issue is likely to achieve the goal of the constitutional
provision).
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for determining how far school officials must go to overcome barriers
to education that they have not created, requiring them simply to take
reasonable steps to ensure that budget shortfalls, employee and
student misconduct, and societal factors do not prevent students from
receiving an adequate education.
B. Constitutional Torts Claims
The second option for parents seeking redress against inadequate
schools would be to bring a lawsuit based directly on their state
constitution's education article rather than on substantive due process
or equal protection theories.232 So-called "constitutional tort" claims
are private causes of action brought against government employees
for constitutional violationsP3 These claims were rare until the 1960s,
but have become more popular in recent decades because they often
allow plaintiffs to recover monetary damages in addition to or in lieu
of injunctions and other traditional constitutional remedies.2
232. See supra notes 15 (listing cases acknowledging substantive education
requirements), 47 (listing constitutional education provisions for all 50 states); see also
supra Part III.A. (discussing traditional substantive due process and equal protection
litigation options).
233. See Gail Donoghue & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life After Brown: The Future of
State Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 447 (1998).
The term "constitutional tort" first appeared in the 1960s. Professor Marshall S. Shapo
coined the phrase in discussing civil actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows
plaintiffs to recover damages for violations of their federal constitutional rights by state or
local government officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997); Donoghue & Edelstein,
supra, at 450 n.10; Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 277 (1965). The term has since been used to
refer both to § 1983 actions and to causes of action implied directly from state and federal
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978) (referring to a § 1983 claim); Bagg v. University of Tex. Med. Branch, 726 S.W.2d
582, 584 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (referring to a claim brought directly under that state's
constitution).
234. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING
INDiVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES §§ 7-1 to -2 (2d ed. 1995 & Cum. Supp.
1998) (calling civil actions the "[m]issing [r]emedial [l]ink" in state constitutional law).
Most constitutional tort claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was passed as
part of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, but remained largely unused for its first 90 years. See
Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and for Other Purposes, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997)); Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 5, 5 (1980). See generally Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson:
Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REV.
101 (1986) (discussing United States Supreme Court cases attempting to redefine the
difference between constitutional torts and state common law claims); William Burnham,
Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed
Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 515, 526-27 (1989) (discussing the
distinction between constitutional and common law torts). The number of constitutional
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Although most constitutional tort litigation occurs at the federal
level,235 at least twenty states have recognized constitutional causes of
action for damages,236 and courts in another five have indicated that
tort claims began to skyrocket after the United States Supreme Court held in Monroe v.
Pape that plaintiffs could bring § 1983 claims even when states provided adequate
common law remedies. 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978); see also Whitman, supra, at 6
(reporting that petitions rose from a few hundred in 1961 to almost 25,000 in 1979).
Because the Burger and Rehnquist Courts created new procedural and substantive
obstacles to § 1983 cases, the focus has begun to shift to state courts. See FRIESEN, supra,
§ 7-2.
235. See supra note 234.
236. Eight states have passed statutes that either create direct causes of action or that
remove sovereign immunity as a bar to such claims. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-123-105
(Michie Supp. 1999) (echoing 42 U.S.C. § 1983); CAL. Civ. CODE § 52.1 (West Supp.
1999) (allowing claims when threats, intimidation, or coercion infringe upon constitutional
rights); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4681 (West Supp. 1998) (using language similar to
the California statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12 §§ 11H-11I (West 1988) (same);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-148 (1997) (allowing claims against individuals and corporations,
but not political subdivisions); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4 to -12 (Michie 1996) (removing
immunity for violations by law enforcement officers); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (Law Co-
op. 1985) (allowing claims against counties); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 104.001-.002 (West 1988) (allowing state indemnification for violations by public
officials under certain circumstances).
Courts in at least 12 other states have recognized such claims on their own
authority. See Bull v. Armstrong, 48 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1950) (search and seizure);
Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 689 (Conn. 1998) (search and seizure); Walinski v.
Morrison & Morrison, 377 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (right to be free from
gender discrimination); Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990) (privacy and
search and seizure); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 930 (Md. 1984)
(due process and search and seizure); Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 410 N.W.2d
749, 751 (Mich. 1987) (mem.) (stating generally that damages claims should be allowed in
appropriate cases); Burdette v. State, 421 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (due
process); Mayes v. Till, 266 So. 2d 578, 580-81 (Miss. 1972) (search and seizure); Lloyd v.
Stone Harbor, 432 A.2d 572, 580 (N.J. 1981) (right to be free from employment
discrimination); Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees
Local No. 680, 152 A.2d 331, 336 (N.J. 1959) (stating generally that damages are an
appropriate remedy for violations of a constitutional provision on collective bargaining);
Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1137-39 (N.Y. 1996) (equal protection and search and
seizure); Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 786, 413 S.E.2d 276, 292 (1992) (free
speech); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 1996) (freedom from unnecessarily
rigorous treatment by prison officials); Old Tuckaway Assocs. v. City of Greenfield, 509
N.W.2d 323, 328 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (due process). Federal courts have interpreted
two other state constitutions as supporting damages claims for rights violations. See Jones
v. Rhode Island, 724 F. Supp. 25, 30 (D.R.I. 1989) (due process under the Rhode Island
Constitution); Barlow v. AVCO Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269, 273 (E.D. Va. 1981) (right to be
free from gender discrimination under the Virginia Constitution).
In addition, California courts have recognized constitutional claims for damages
independently of that state's civil rights statute. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 602 (Cal. 1979) (equal protection). The
Massachusetts courts have indicated that they might do the same. See Phillips v. Youth
Dev. Prog., 459 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Mass. 1983) ("We would grant, however, that a person
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they would or might recognize such claims under certain
circumstancesP 7  Only four states appear to have categorically
rejected constitutional torts. 8
Predicting the outcome of a constitutional tort claim based on
the right to an adequate education is difficult because analyses differ
widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Even among states that have
recognized such claims, courts generally examine each constitutional
provision separately to determine whether it supports a direct cause
of action and whether damages are an appropriate remedy for
violationsP 9 To make matters more confusing, courts often blur the
whose constitutional rights have been interfered with may be entitled to judicial relief
even in the absence of a statute providing a procedural vehicle for obtaining relief.").
Texas courts, however, have held that plaintiffs may bring suits only for injunctive relief in
the absence of statutory authority to seek damages for constitutional violations. See
Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143,149-50 (Tex. 1995).
237. See Dick Fischer Dev. No. 2, Inc. v. Department of Admin., 838 P.2d 263, 268
(Alaska 1992) ("[W]e will not allow a claim for damages except in cases of flagrant
constitutional violations where little or no alternative remedies are available."); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545, 553 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) ("[I]t may be
appropriate to recognize an implied state constitutional cause of action where there is no
other adequate remedy .... "); Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 282 (N.H. 1995) ("Where
no established remedy exists or the established remedies would be meaningless ... we will
not hesitate to exercise our authority to create an appropriate remedy."); Provens v. Stark
County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 594 N.E.2d 959, 961-62
(Ohio 1992) ("Even though this court is empowered to grant relief ... by creating a new
remedy, we shall refrain from doing so where other statutory provisions and
administrative procedures provide meaningful remedies."); Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d
924, 934 (Vt. 1995) ("We agree that it may be appropriate to imply a monetary damages
remedy to enforce constitutional rights where the Legislature has fashioned no other
adequate remedial scheme.").
238. See State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 437 S.E.2d 290, 293 (Ga. 1993) (holding that the
state had waived its sovereign immunity on constitutional issues only as to declaratory
judgments, not damages claims); Hunter v. City of Eugene, 787 P.2d 881, 884 (Or. 1990)
(holding that constitutional rights plaintiffs are limited to existing common law, equitable,
and statutory remedies unless the legislature acts to create a private right of action for
damages); Lee v. Ladd, 834 S.W.2d 323,325 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no authority to
imply a private cause of action for damages); Systems Amusement, Inc. v. State, 500 P.2d
1253, 1254-55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the state's due process clause does not
provide authority to create a new cause of action for damages). The supreme courts of
Hawaii and North Dakota have faced only constitutional torts claims brought against state
agencies, rather than individual government employees; both courts rejected the claims on
sovereign immunity grounds. See Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1206-07 (Haw. 1980)
(holding that the state had not waived its sovereign immunity); Kristensen v. Strinden, 343
N.W.2d 67, 74-75 (N.D. 1983) (holding that the state legislature had not consented to
suit). But see Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632, 633 (N.D. 1994)
(abolishing sovereign immunity 10 years after the Kristensen decision).
239. Compare Fenton v. Groveland Community Servs. Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 758,762-64
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing a damages claim based on the right to vote), with
Bonner v. City of Santa Ana, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to
recognize claims for due process and equal protection). Compare also Binette v. Sabo, 710
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distinction between right and remedy, so that they bar constitutional
tort claims entirely where damages are inappropriate." ° This Section
outlines the most common models of analysis used by state courts,
concluding that education claims are more likely to succeed in states
that do not follow federal constitutional precedents- 41
1. The Federal Model: Bivens
Much as with substantive due process and equal protection
theories, many state courts and plaintiffs look to the example set by
the United States Supreme Court in discussing constitutional tort
claims.- The Court first recognized a direct cause of action under
A.2d 688, 693-700 (Conn. 1998) (recognizing a damages claim based on Connecticut's
provisions against unlawful search and seizure), with Kelley Property Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 919-24 (Conn. 1993) (declining to recognize a due process claim).
240. See, e.g., infra notes 254-55. Sovereign immunity also has limited constitutional
tort litigation in many states. See generally FRIESEN, supra note 234, §§ 8-1 to -8
(discussing government immunity); T. Hunter Jefferson, Note, Constitutional Wrongs and
Common Law Principles: The Case for the Recognition of State Constitutional Tort
Actions Against State Governments, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1525, 1541-43 (1997) (same).
While some state courts have held that sovereign immunity is a bar to constitutional tort
claims, see, e.g., Drury, 437 S.E.2d at 293 (basing its decision on Georgia constitutional
provisions regarding sovereign immunity), others have reached the opposite conclusion,
see, e.g., Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1137 (holding that the New York immunity statute exempts
constitutional violations); Corum, 330 N.C. at 785-86, 413 S.E.2d at 291-92 (holding that a
common law sovereign immunity doctrine does not apply to constitutional violations).
Even when sovereign immunity does not apply, however, the doctrine of qualified
immunity based on a defendant's good faith may be available. See, e.g., Moresi, 567 So. 2d
at 1093. But see Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 541 A.2d 1303, 1312-13 (Md. 1988) (holding
that public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity for constitutional violations, but
that punitive damages cannot be recovered in the absence of actual malice).
241. In addition to the two analyses outlined in the text, courts frequently look to
framers' intent in deciding whether to recognize a cause of action. See, e.g., Jones, 724 F.
Supp. at 34-35; Gates v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 512-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Binette, 710 A.2d at 693; Walinski, 377 N.E.2d at 244-45; Beaumont, 896 S.W.2d at 148. A
few courts also have cited to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which includes a comment
in its section dealing with implied statutory causes of action indicating that the same
analysis can apply to constitutional provisions. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
§ 874A & cmt. a (1979) (stating that when a provision is silent as to remedies, a court may
recognize a right of action if the court concludes that the remedy is appropriate in
furtherance of the provision's purpose, the remedy is needed to assure the effectiveness of
the provision, and the plaintiff is a member of the class that the provision was intended to
protect); see also Binette, 710 A.2d at 693 (citing section 874A cmt. a); Shields, 658 A.2d at
932 (same). Some courts also have relied upon the existence of similar common law
causes of action prior to the ratification of state constitutional provisions and the fact that
English common law allowed actions for trespass to redress violations of rights protected
by the Magna Carta and similar fundamental documents. See Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1092;
Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 923-24.
242. See, e.g., King v. Alaska State Housing Auth., 633 P.2d 256,259-61 (Alaska 1981)
(analyzing damages claim under the framework established in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); Sundheim, 926 P.2d at
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the Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,243 which involved a Fourth Amendment
challenge by a plaintiff who claimed that federal agents had used
unreasonable force in conducting a warrantless search of his
apartment and arresting him in front of his family.2" The Court
reasoned that a claim must exist directly under the Constitution
because citizens often have no other legal means of protecting their
homes from invasion by government officials. 245 Because states
cannot limit the exercise of federal authority, the Court held, an
independent claim under the Federal Constitution was "both
necessary and sufficient to make out the plaintiff's cause of action. 2 46
The Court then went on to address the question of damages.
Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly authorize a
claim for damages, Bivens noted that "damages have been regarded
as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in
liberty" and that federal courts generally " 'may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done.' "247 Nevertheless, the Court
indicated that it would reject damages claims in cases where there
were "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress" or when Congress had declared
explicitly that plaintiffs should be remitted to another, equally
effective remedy instead of damages suits.2 48 In his concurrence,
Justice Harlan observed that the judiciary has a special responsibility
550-53 (analyzing a Colorado claim using federal framework); Binette, 710 A.2d at 690-
700 (recognizing a Connecticut claim based on the policy reasons in Bivens); Smith v.
Department of Pub. Health, 410 N.W.2d 749, 781-87 (Mich. 1987) (Brickley, J.
concurring) (mem.) (discussing federal case law at length before analyzing a Michigan
claim); Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 962-66 (following federal precedent in handling an Ohio
claim); Old Tuckaway Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Greenfield, 509 N.W.2d 323, 328 n.4(Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that damages claims under the Wisconsin Constitution
are a "logical extension" of Bivens).
243. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
244. See iL at 389. Bivens could not sue the defendants under § 1983 because it applies
only to constitutional deprivations under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
111997).
245. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95.
246. Id. at 395.
247. Id. at 395, 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)); accord Moresi v.
State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990) ("Historically, damages have been regarded as the
appropriate remedy for an invasion of a person's interest in liberty or property.").
248. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; cf Jones v. Rhode Island, 724 F. Supp. 25, 34-35 (D.R.I.
1989) (noting that the Rhode Island legislature had not prohibited constitutional torts and
that there were no special factors counseling hesitation in the case); Binette v. Sabo, 710
A.2d 688, 697-98 (Conn. 1998) (noting that the Connecticut legislature had neither




to protect constitutional interests in the Bill of Rights.24 9 Yet, because
traditional constitutional remedies are not effective in all situations,
he wrote, for some plaintiffs "it is damages or nothing." '
In the thirty years since Bivens, the Court has recognized
damages claims for unreasonable search and seizure, cruel and
unusual punishment, and equal protection by way of the Fifth
Amendment, 1' while rejecting claims in cases involving free speech
and due process. 52 Over time, the Court's analysis appears to have
collapsed the two sections of the Bivens opinion, so that it now
analyzes whether to recognize a direct cause of action for damages
rather than looking separately at whether there is a direct cause of
action and whether damages are an appropriate remedy.253 Thus, if
the Court has found that there are "special factors counselling
hesitation," it has barred plaintiffs not just from damages remedies
but from bringing lawsuits at all. 4 At the same time, the Court has
expanded its list of "special factors" by giving greater deference to
the legislative branch in determining what remedy to afford victims of
constitutional rights violations. Although the original Bivens analysis
looked for explicit declarations by Congress that it had created an
"equally effective" alternative remedy, 5 the Court subsequently has
249. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
250. Id at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents
entered his apartment without a warrant, threatened to arrest his entire family, took him
to a federal courthouse, and strip-searched him. See id. at 389; id. at 410 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (noting that injunctive relief is rarely available in such situations and that the
exclusionary rule would not help Bivens if he was innocent of the crime charged).
251. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980) (cruel and unusual punishment);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 231, 234-35 (1979) (equal protection principles by way of
the Fifth Amendment); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-97 (search and seizure).
252. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (due process); United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987) (due process); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
388-89 (1983) (free speech).
253. Compare, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-97 (analyzing separately whether a direct
cause of action exists under the Fourth Amendment and whether damages can be awarded
in the absence of "special factors counselling hesitation"), with Stanley, 483 U.S. at 678
(stating that Bivens suggested that inferring a direct cause of action for damages from the
Constitution "might not be appropriate when there are 'special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress' " (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at
396)).
254. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297, 301-05 (1983) (barring a Fifth
Amendment claim by military personnel seeking not just damages, but also declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief, on the grounds that it would interfere with Congress's
system for regulating military life).
255. 403 U.S. at 397; accord Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-23 (noting that Congress had not
declared the Federal Tort Claims Act to be an equivalent remedy and concluding that an
FTCA claim is not equivalent to a constitutional tort cause of action because the Act does
not allow punitive damages or jury trials, has less of a deterrent effect, and denies relief
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relaxed this requirement.5 6 The Court has also deferred to Congress
in areas of special constitutional authority and lawmaking activity1 7
In rejecting damages claims, the Court has also emphasized the effect
that allowing direct causes of action for damages would have on
discipline and morale in particular settings, specifically the militaryP8
Although some state courts have recognized constitutional tort
claims under a Bivens analysis,1 9 many have followed the Court's
recent example by deferring to existing remedies even when they are
not equivalent to constitutional torts2 60 and by deferring to the
legislative branch in areas in which it is particularly active or has
specific constitutional authority.261 State courts have also identified
where state law would not permit a cause of action).
256. See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 429 (deferring to existing remedies because
"[w]hether or not we believe that [Congress's] response was the best response, Congress is
the body charged with making the inevitable compromises required in the design of a
massive and complex welfare benefits program"); Bush, 462 U.S. at 388 (stating that the
decision to recognize constitutional torts cannot be made "simply by noting that existing
remedies do not provide complete relief").
257. See, e.g., Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 429 (barring a claim involving Social Security
benefits because Congress is charged with designing social welfare programs); Bush, 462
U.S. at 380-89 (barring a claim involving "federal personnel policy" because Congress has
more expertise in determining remedies); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301-05 (barring a claim by
military personnel because the Constitution assigns Congress special responsibilities
regarding the armed forces and because Congress is active in setting rules for the military).
For criticisms of the Court's growing deference to the legislative branch, see, for example,
Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REv.
289 (1995); George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the
Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263 (1989); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky,
and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117 (1989).
258. See, e.g., Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683.
259. See, e.g., Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 690 (Conn. 1998) (recognizing a claim
based on a warrantless search); Old Tuckaway Assocs. v. City of Greenfield, 509 N.W.2d
323, 328-29 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a trial court had not erred in allowing
plaintiffs to bring a damages claim based on state due process rights).
260. See Bonner v. City of Santa Anna, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678, (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(rejecting a constitutional claim when a common law tort could provide relief but no
punitive damages); Board of County Comm'rs v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1996) (en
banc) (concluding that judicial review of administrative decisions and claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provided an adequate remedy); Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental
Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 594 N.E.2d 959, 965 (Ohio 1992) (barring a
claim because administrative appeals and arbitration could provide some relief). But see
Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921, 928-29 (Md. 1984) ("[T]he existence
of other available remedies, or a lack thereof, is not a persuasive basis for resolution of the
issue before us.").
261. See Kelley Property Dev., Inc. v. Town of Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 924 (Conn.
1993) (barring a constitutional tort claim and deferring to town government in the
handling of political disputes about zoning issues); Smith v. Department of Pub. Health,
410 N.W.2d 749, 789 (Mich. 1987) (Brickley, J., concurring) (suggesting that a cause of
action should be barred because a subsequent constitutional amendment assigned
responsibility for the provisions at issue to the legislature); Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 965
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additional "special factors counselling hesitation," including the risk
of creating a flood of litigation, incurring significant costs to
government defendants, and burdening the court system.262
Under the Bivens framework as it has been developed by federal
and state courts, there appear to be two significant barriers to
constitutional torts based on the right to an adequate education. The
first is the nature of the right itself. Constitutional tort cases to date
have focused on traditional negative liberties based in state and
federal bills of rights.263 The right to an adequate education, in
contrast, is based in separate education articles and is positive in
nature.2 4  While some state courts have declared broadly that
damages claims are appropriate to protect affirmative and
fundamental constitutional rights,265 others have been reluctant to
recognize claims for "amorphous" rights such as equal protection and
due process because of uncertainty about the implications.266 Thus,
despite the affirmative nature of the right to an adequate education267
and the school financing precedents declaring the right to be
(deferring to the legislative process for providing remedies to public employees).
262. See King v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 260-01 (Alaska 1981)
(declining to recognize a constitutional tort claim because doing so would "subject public
agencies to endless lawsuits by disappointed bidders" on public projects); Kelley Property
Dev., Inc., 627 A.2d at 924 (barring a constitutional tort claim because the potential for
monetary awards "would encourage its pursuit by any disappointed zoning applicant
whenever a zoning agency denies the sought after permit or application").
263. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that interests in the Bill of Rights
are the most worthy of protection through causes of action for damages); supra notes 236
and 242 (listing cases that have recognized state constitutional tort claims for various types
of rights). Claims based on unconstitutional searches and sEizures and on cruel and
unusual punishments appear to be particularly successful. See supra notes 236 and 242.
264. See supra notes 15,47,198-200 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Moresi v. Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1092
(La. 1990) (emphasizing the affirmative nature of Louisiana's right to privacy); Cooper v.
Nutley Sun Printing Co., 175 A.2d 639, 643 (N.J. 1961) (concluding that New Jersey
residents' right to collective bargaining "should be accorded the same stature as other
fundamental rights" and enforced through a direct cause of action); cf Jones v. Memorial
Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing a cause of action for
equitable relief because the Texas Constitution contains a positive guarantee of free
expression rather than simply a negative restriction on government interference).
266. See Bonner v. City of Santa Ana, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(suggesting that a common law tort provides a better remedy than a claim under the
"relatively amorphous" state due process clause); Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 788 (Brickley, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that equal protection rights may not be appropriate for damages
claims); 77th District Judge v. State, 438 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that damages are an inappropriate remedy for a "broad and amorphous" concept such as
equal protection).
267. See supra notes 15,198-200 and accompanying text.
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fundamental in some states,268 there is support in some jurisdictions
for acting cautiously when rights are not clearly defined.269
The second, more obvious barrier is the case law barring
constitutional tort claims when there are "special factors counselling
hesitation.""0 Like many of the topics addressed in "special factors"
cases, education is an area in which legislatures are particularly active
and often have special constitutional authority.27 Public schools also
have unique discipline and morale issues, raising concerns that
litigation would disrupt student-teacher relations.2 72 Finally, courts
have worried since the first educational malpractice cases in the 1970s
that awarding damages for adequacy claims could produce a flood of
lawsuits that would strain the judicial system and school budgets.2 73
268. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., Bonner, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678; Smith, 410 N.W.2d at 788 (Brickley, J.,
concurring); supra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing amorphous rights).
270. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971).
271. See Hubsch, supra note 29, at 1329 (reporting that all but eight state constitutions
appear to grant the legislature plenary power over education); supra note 5 (discussing
legislative reforms to increase public school accountability); cf. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487
U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (deferring to existing remedies because Congress is charged with
designing social welfare programs); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380-89 (1983) (deferring
to Congressional expertise over "federal personnel policy"); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 301-05 (1983) (noting Congress's constitutional duties regarding the military in
declining to recognize a claim from enlisted military personnel); supra note 260 (discussing
similar state cases).
272. See, e.g., Duross v. Freeman, No. 04-91-00333-CV, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 1608, at
*5 (Tex. Ct. App. June 17, 1992) (Peebles, J., concurring) (arguing that allowing lawsuits
against local schools would undermine the authority of all educators); John Elson, A
Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless
Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 648 (1978) (discussing the argument that the adversarial
nature of litigation would disrupt the collaborative educational process); Funston, supra
note 131, at 804-06 (discussing the risk that educational lawsuits will lead to "defensive
education" practices and will discourage experimentation in education); cf. United States
v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) (concluding that the "mere process of arriving at
correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime"); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304
(concluding that the "special nature of military life" would be undermined if officers were
personally liable to the people they command).
273. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(predicting that "the courts could be deluged and schools shut down" if students were
allowed to bring damages claims against any school or school employee), affd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Peter W. v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (predicting that the
financial burden on schools and society from individual damages claims would be "beyond
calculation"); cf. King v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 633 P.2d 256, 260-61 (Alaska 1981)
(declining to recognize a constitutional tort claim for fear that public agencies would be
subjected "to endless lawsuits by disappointed bidders"); Kelley Property Dev., Inc. v.
Town of Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 924 (Conn. 1993) (declining to recognize a constitutional
tort because doing so would encourage disappointed zoning applicants to file suit). But
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Consequently, plaintiffs would probably be unable to convince courts
to grant them relief under the modem Bivens analysis.
2. The Two-Pronged Approach
The second commonly used analysis for constitutional torts deals
with many of the same issues that arise under Bivens, but more
clearly distinguishes between right and remedy.274 The first prong of
this analysis determines whether the constitutional provision is "self-
executing" and therefore will support a direct cause of action. The
second prong determines whether damages are an appropriate
remedy for violations of the constitutional right at issue.275 Because
the two questions are distinct, therefore, courts using this form of
analysis are more likely to recognize constitutional tort claims for
violations of the right to an adequate education even if they decide
that damages are an inappropriate remedy for such claims.
a. Self-Executing Provisions
The analysis of whether constitutional and treaty provisions are
"self-executing" dates back to the early days of the United States 7 6
Definitions of what makes a provision self-executing are often
vague,277 but courts generally look at whether a particular provision
see Elson, supra note 272, at 762 (noting a number of advantages to monetary damages
over affirmative relief, including the fact that plaintiffs can choose their own remedial
services and that damages require less judicial entanglement in daily school operations).
274. See Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions, and
the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 333, 355
(1993) (stating that the Bivens doctrine presupposed the existence of an enforceable right,
while courts that engage in self-execution analysis do not make such a presupposition).
275. See, e.g., Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass'n v. Town of Conway, 503
A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.H. 1986) (describing and applying a two-step process); Brown v. State,
674 N.E.2d 1129, 1137-38 (N.Y. 1996) (same); Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,
782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289-90 (1992) (noting that a constitutional provision is self-executing
and discussing criteria to determine what remedy is appropriate without specifically
identifying a two-step analysis); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737-40 (Utah 1996)
(describing and applying a two-step analysis); Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 927-34
(Vt. 1995) (same).
276. See Fernandez, supra note 274, at 335-39 (describing cases from the 1790s through
the late 1800s at the state and federal level). In constitutional law, much recent
commentary on this subject has focused on state environmental provisions. See, e.g., idL;
Cusack, supra note 161, passim.
277. See John M. Baker, The Minnesota Constitution as a Sword: The Evolving Private
Cause of Action, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 322 (1994) ("[T]he 'tests' for self-
executing provisions are frequently difficult to apply and are somewhat circular.");
Donoghue & Edelstein, supra note 233, at 471 & n.120 ("[A]n exact definition of self-
execution has proved elusive.").
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provides sufficient detail to be judicially enforceable. 28 While state
acts that violate a constitutional provision will be struck down as void,
not all provisions in themselves create a direct cause of action.279
Provisions in bills of rights generally are considered self-executing,210
but courts have held other constitutional sections to be non-self-
executing when they contain only general statements of principles21
or when they require the legislative branch to define the right in
further detail or provide for enforcement through ancillarylegislation.m
278. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1360 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "self-executing
constitutional provisions" as "provisions which are immediately effective without the
necessity of ancillary legislation"); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 167 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927) ("A
constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by
means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be
enforced."); see also Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900) (quoting Cooley); FRIESEN,
supra note 234, § 7-5 ("[Tlhis argument truly concerns whether a clause is judicially
enforceable at all .... "); Donoghue & Edelstein, supra note 233, at 471 & n.120 ("[T]he
term 'self-executing' is essentially another means of stating that a provision is
enforceable."); Fernandez, supra note 274, at 333 ("For a constitutional provision to be
self-executing, the provision must provide the court with a complete and enforceable
rule."); Richard A. Goldberg & Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers' Organizational and
Collective Bargaining Rights in New Jersey: Implementing Self-Executing State
Constitutional Rights, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 729, 734 (1987) ("This standard of construction
obviously refers to judicial enforcement. The question of whether a state constitutional
provision is self-executing is, therefore, made by the courts based on their assessment of
the manageability of enforcing the right at issue."); see also Part IV (discussing concerns
about the manageability of educational adequacy claims).
279. See, e.g., Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 690-91 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (noting that state agencies are prohibited from taking official actions that
contravene constitutional provisions, but that provisions can be mandatory without being
self-executing); Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 148-49 (Tex. 1995) (noting that
the Texas Bill of Rights provides that anything done in violation of a provision is void, but
does not authorize damages for such violations); COOLEY, supra note 278, at 166 n.2;
Donoghue & Edelstein, supra note 233, at 473-75 (noting that all constitutional provisions
are prohibitory because they limit certain government actions, but do not necessarily
support an action for damages).
280. See, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 674 (Va. 1985); Donoghue
& Edelstein, supra note 233, at 472.
281. See, e.g., Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 928-30 (Vt. 1995) (recognizing a
constitutional tort based on the right to free speech, but declining to recognize one based
on a provision guaranteeing an inalienable right to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety); FRIESEN, supra note 234, § 7-5(a) (discussing state constitutional provisions that
echo the Declaration of Independence as important for determining framers' intent but as
problematic as a source of discrete, judicially enforceable rights).
282. See, e.g., Leger, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 688 (declining to recognize a constitutional tort
based on a provision guaranteeing safe schools because it declares a general right without
specifying any rules for enforcement); State v. Rodrigues, 629 P.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Haw.
1981) (holding that a constitutional provision creating the position of independent grand
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State courts initially presumed that most constitutional
provisions would require enabling legislation, but that presumption
has been reversed in modem times as state constitutions have been
amended to grant rights and impose specific duties on government
officials. Despite the new presumption, however, some courts and
commentators continue to use language from older versions of the
self-execution test, suggesting categorically that provisions assigning
responsibility for a topic to the legislature cannot be enforced by the
judiciary. This use of the old language is seldom problematic when
dealing with provisions in states' bills of rights because of the way
traditional negative liberties are phrased, but it raises significant
issues in dealing with claims based on the right to an adequate
education.
The problem is that all but a handful of state constitutions assign
primary responsibility for education to the legislative branch. Thus,
if courts in these jurisdictions mechanically apply the older versions of
the self-executing test,26 they would conclude that the right to an
adequate education is not self-executing because education is
jury counsel is not self-executing in part because it fails to specify appointment procedures
and other details); COOLEY, supra note 278, at 165, 168-69 (discussing constitutional
provisions dealing with the incorporation of cities and other topics that do not provide
"proper machinery" for enforcement without more specific legislation); Fernandez, supra
note 270, at 338 n.23 (suggesting that the United States Supreme Court held that a
particular provision was not self-executing because it would have needed the power to
appropriate funds and enforce rules to implement the provision).
283. Compare AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 142 (1993) (listing cases recognizing
the new presumption and arguing that to hold otherwise would give legislatures "the
power to ignore and practically nullify the directions of the fundamental law"), Donoghue
& Edelstein, supra note 233, at 476 n.143 (discussing New York cases creating a
presumption that twentieth-century constitutional provisions are self-executing), and
Fernandez, supra note 274, at 339-41 (suggesting that continuing the original presumption
would have discounted the people's authority to limit their grant of power to the
legislature through the constitutional amendment process), with COOLEY, supra note 278,
at 165 (stating that constitutional provisions may be mandatory in their nature to the
legislature to enact related legislation, yet may provide no authority to enforce the
command).
284. See Leger, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 691 (stating that self-executing provisions must have
"'no language indicating that the subject is referred to the Legislature for action'"
(quoting Taylor v. Madigan, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975))); Shields, 658
A.2d at 928 ("Ordinarily a self-executing provision does not contain a directive to the
legislature for further action."); FRIESEN, supra note 234, § 7-5(a) (contrasting self-
executing clauses with those "that are merely precatory or that contemplate further action
by the legislature"); Donoghue & Edelstein, supra note 233, at 476-77 & n.145 (discussing
Vermont and New York decisions focusing on whether the constitutional provisions at
issue contain directives to the legislature).
285. See Hubsch, supra note 29, at 1329 (reporting that 42 state constitutions appear to
grant the legislature plenary power over education).
286. See supra note 280-82.
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assigned to state legislatures. It is difficult to reconcile such a
conclusion, however, with the school financing cases holding that the
right to an adequate education is judicially enforceable.m Although
the adequacy precedents did not use a formal "self-executing"
analysis, they weighed concerns about judicially manageable
standards and separation of powers in holding that students have an
enforceable right to education under their states' constitutions.m
Those precedents should be determinative in deciding whether state
education clauses are self-executing.
b. Damages as Appropriate Relief
In moving to the second prong of the two-step analysis, state
courts have used a variety of criteria to determine whether damages
are appropriate relief for self-executing clauses. 89 Much like the
courts that engage in "special factors" Bivens analyses, 290 their
remedy decisions often depend on the availability of existing
remedies29' and concern over the impact that damages claims would
have on other branches of government. 2 2  As discussed earlier,
educational malpractice precedents have raised concerns that
damages claims would have a severely negative impact on both the
schools and the courts.2 193  Educational malpractice cases also have
287. See supra note 15. Such a result would not be inconsistent in states that have not
recognized a right to education in school financing cases, however. See, e.g., Agostine v.
School Dist., 527 A.2d 193, 195 (Pa. Commw. 1987) (holding in a special education claim
that the state constitution did not confer an individual right on each student to a particular
level or quality of education); see also Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999)
(holding that students had not presented a cause of action in a school financing case);
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360,365 (Pa. 1979) (same).
288. See supra Part I.
289. At least one state court has indicated that all self-executing provisions are
enforceable by a claim for damages, but this is a minority rule. See Bott v. DeLand, 922
P.2d 732 (Utah 1996); FRESEN, supra note 234, § 7.5(a) (noting cases suggesting that
meeting the self-executing test is sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to a claim for damages, but
concluding that it does not necessarily follow that a court must provide monetary relief).
290. See supra notes 256-57.
291. See, e.g., Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272,282 (N.H. 1995) (concluding that existing
common law remedies were adequate, even though they were not as complete as a
constitutional tort claim); Rousselo v. Starling, 128 N.C. App. 439,449,495 S.E.2d 725,732
(barring a constitutional tort claim when a common law remedy was available but would
require additional elements of proof), disc. rev. denied, 348 N.C. 74, 505 S.E.2d 876 (1998);
Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 934 (Vt. 1995) (indicating that the court would normally
defer to legislative remedies even if they are not as effective as constitutional tort claims).
292. See, e.g., Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 784, 413 S.E.2d 276, 291
(1992) (instructing the lower court to choose a remedy that would minimize the intrusion
on the political branches); Shields, 658 A.2d at 936 (declining to recognize a constitutional
tort for fear that it would "eviscerate" the legislature's scheme for licensing child cares).
293. See supra notes 273.
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suggested that damages are an inappropriate remedy because they
are not a substitute for an education and are inherently speculative in
nature.294 Given these concerns, plaintiffs probably will have a
difficult time at this stage of the analysis even if they convince courts
that their states' education articles are self-executing.
Yet while chances appear slim that state courts would allow
damages as a remedy for violations of the right to an adequate
education, this fact does not necessarily preclude the recognition of a
cause of action directly under state constitutions' education
provisions.295 Many court decisions recognizing constitutional tort
claims have hinged upon the inadequacy or non-existence of other
remedies. 96 These decisions provide a strong argument in the
education context because existing remedies are particularly poor.
Although a few educational malpractice cases have pointed to non-
judicial avenues for parents to seek relief,297 the malpractice cases
294. See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556-57 (Alaska
1981) (suggesting corrective tutorial programs are more appropriate than money
damages); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982) (concluding that "an
award of money damages ... represents a singularly inappropriate remedy for asserted
errors in the educational process"); Eschweiler, supra note 131, at 110 (noting that lost
opportunity costs would vary widely depending on whether a student would have obtained
a minimum wage job or become a professional if she had received an adequate education).
295. The Texas courts, for instance, have recognized a direct cause of action for
equitable relief of violations of the right to free speech, see Jones v. Memorial Hospital,
Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Tex. App. 1988), but have barred claims seeking damages
for such violations, see Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 149-50 (Tex. 1995)
(distinguishing between claims for injunctive and monetary relief).
296. See, e.g., Barlow v. AVCO Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269, 272-73 (E.D. Va. 1981)
("There is no Virginia statute which gives the citizens of Virginia the protection that [this
anti-discrimination] clause of the Constitution provides. Therefore, it would have been
senseless to include it in the Constitution unless a private right of action was also
available."); Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 410 N.W.2d 749, 796 (Mich. 1987)
(Boyle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]here are circumstances in which
a constitutional right can only be vindicated by a damage remedy and where the right itself
calls out for such a remedy."); Marquay, 662 A.2d at 282 ("Where no established remedy
exists or the established remedies would be meaningless, however, we will not hesitate to
exercise our authority to create an appropriate remedy."); Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing
Co., 175 A.2d 639, 643 (NJ. 1961) (recognizing a direct cause of action because to hold
otherwise "would be to say that our Constitution embodies rights in a vacuum, existing
only on paper"); Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289 ("[When neither the state
constitution nor statutes afford] an adequate remedy under a particular fact situation, the
common law will furnish the appropriate action .... A direct action against the State for
its violations of free speech is essential to the preservation of free speech."); id. at 783, 413
S.E.2d at 290 ("It is the state judiciary that has the responsibility to protect the state
constitutional rights of the citizens; this obligation to protect the fundamental rights of
individuals is as old as the State."); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 1996)
(recognizing a claim for damages for unnecessarily vigorous treatment by prison officials
because injunctive relief might not be adequate to remedy prisoners' injuries).
297. See D.S.W., 628 P.2d at 557 (discussing recourse for parents of special education
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themselves establish generally that no judicial remedies are available
to children who receive an inadequate education from public
schools.29 Given this lack of remedy and the positive nature of the
right to an adequate education,299 plaintiffs have a strong argument
that the fact that damages are not appropriate for education claims
should not preclude them from bringing claims seeking other types of
judicial relief.3 0 Part IV discusses what types of remedies might be
most appropriate and addresses other litigation issues that are likely
to arise in adjudicating individual adequacy claims.
IV. ARE ADEQUACY CLAIMS JUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE?
Adapting traditional constitutional theories to fit the right to an
adequate education is only one of the challenges that state courts
would face in adjudicating students' claims against local schools. As
state courts recognized when they encountered educational
malpractice cases in the 1970s and 1980s, adequacy claims raise
difficult issues regarding educational standards, injury, causation, and
remedy in addition to fears of a flood of litigation.30 ' Although the
students); Hunter, 439 A.2d at 585-86 (listing grievance procedures for special education
students as well as for general complaints about public schools); Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (N.Y. 1979) (noting that families could
appeal to New York's Commissioner of Education for assistance with education
problems); Funston, supra note 131, at 799-801 (suggesting that accountability programs
developed by legislators, state administrators, and local officials are sufficient to address
the concerns raised by educational malpractice claims).
298. See supra notes 4, 6, 8 and accompanying text. The situation is somewhat different
in cases involving claims based on a failure to diagnose and place special education
students in appropriate settings because federal laws have created an extensive system of
administrative and judicial remedies, including restitution for certain educational expenses
but not damages claims. See, e.g., Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 633
n.3 (4th Cir. 1985); Sellers v. School Bd. of Manassas, 960 F. Supp. 1006, 1009-10 (E.D.
Va. 1997). State laws also provide extensive rules and remedies. See supra note 295.
299. See supra notes 198-200.
300. See Ratner, supra note 59, at 810-11 (arguing that equitable remedies would be
more effective in the public school context and less of a threat to the public treasury).
301. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (N.D. II. 1990)
(predicting a deluge of litigation if families are allowed to seek damages for an inadequate
education), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Peter
W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(finding no readily acceptable standards of care, cause, or injury in the education context);
Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1355 (Wachtler, J., concurring) (noting causation issues arising
from the fact that a student's home environment, self-motivation, and personality play an
"immeasurable role" in academic learning). For detailed discussions of educational
malpractice litigation, see generally JOHN COLLIS, EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE:
LIABILITY OF EDUCATORS, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, AND SCHOOL OFFICIALS
(1990); SHARON L. LOCKHART, EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: A PATHFINDER (1995);
YUDOFET AL., supra note 23, at 458-67.
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educational malpractice courts avoided these problems by holding
that educators owed no duty to their pupils,302 state courts may have
little choice but to confront these issues now that the school financing
cases have held that state government is constitutionally required to
provide an education that meets substantive quality standards. 03
This Part suggests a framework for analyzing adequacy claims
and identifies several ways in which state courts could make litigation
more manageable without barring all constitutional claims. While
difficult issues would have to be worked out along the way, state
courts are in a significantly better position to adjudicate adequacy
claims than they were twenty-five years ago.
A. Analyzing Educational Adequacy
If courts recognize a cause of action for violations of the right to
an adequate education outside the school financing context, the
central focus of individual lawsuits would be to determine whether
plaintiffs have received educational services that do not meet
constitutional standards. The educational malpractice courts began
their analysis of educational adequacy by trying to determine whether
teachers' conduct met reasonable or professional standards, 3 4 but the
school financing precedents start from a different point. Many of the
latter cases define an adequate education primarily in terms of
educational "outcomes" -what skills and knowledge students should
gain from the education process-instead of relying exclusively on
"inputs" such as classroom resources and curriculum.05 Under such
302. See supra notes 3-8,301 (citing educational malpractice cases).
303. See supra Part I.B (discussing the cases recognizing constitutional requirements of
a substantive level of education).
304. See, e.g., Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860 ("Unlike the activity of the highway or the
marketplace, classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or
cause, or injury."). The court went on to note that educational experts disagree as to how
and what to teach children and that "any layman might-and commonly does-have his
own emphatic views on the subject." Id at 860-61.
305. The original school financing cases focusing on equal protection and equity
arguments placed heavy emphasis on educational inputs, but ran into conceptual
difficulties because of research indicating that increased spending on education did not
always have a significant impact on student achievement. See supra notes 53, 83-85 and
accompanying text. The third wave of school financing cases focused on outcomes
because that approach allowed them to sidestep the debate over spending levels and focus
on the "fundamental" issue of student achievement. Enrich, supra note 10, at 152 (noting
that attempts to redistribute resources or to change the quality of educational programs
are of "questionable value" if they do not improve student achievement). As
commentators have pointed out, the outcome approach also may have enhanced the
legitimacy of the school financing decisions because the courts were able both to set broad
standards for the public school system and to allow the political branches broad latitude in
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precedents, therefore, courts would have to determine whether
plaintiffs' skills and knowledge meet the constitutional standards in
order to determine the larger question of whether school officials
have failed in their duty to provide an adequate education.
1. Measuring Educational Outcomes
Evaluating students' academic skills is not easy for the judiciary,
but state courts are in a far better position to do so than they were
when the first educational malpractice cases were filed in the 1970s.
Rather than having to develop ad hoc standards for student
achievement, courts can start their analysis by looking to the
definitions of adequacy provided in the school financing cases. 06
determining how to meet those goals. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 73, 79 and accompanying text (quoting and discussing the
standards set forth in Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979), and Rose v.
Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)). Two states have
adopted the Rose standards. See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont II"), 703
A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997). Two others have developed similar lists of their own. An
Alabama court, for instance, relied on existing state standards in finding that Alabama
public schools were inadequate, but used its own standards in ordering relief that would
provide students with
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to function in Alabama,
and at the national and international levels, in the coming years;
(ii) sufficient mathematic and scientific skills to function in Alabama, and at
the national and international levels, in the coming years;
(iii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems generally,
and of the history, politics, and social structure of Alabama and the United
States, specifically, to enable the student to make informed choices;
(iv) sufficient understanding of governmental processes and of basic civic
institutions to enable the student to understand and contribute to the issues that
affect his or her community, state, and nation;
(v) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of principles of health and
mental hygiene to enable the student to monitor and contribute to his or her own
physical and mental well-being;
(vi) sufficient understanding of the arts to enable each student to appreciate
his or her cultural heritage and the cultural heritages of others;
(vii) sufficient training, or preparation for advanced training, in academic or
vocational skills, and sufficient guidance, to enable each child to choose and
pursue life work intelligently;
(viii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in Alabama, in
surrounding states, across the nation, and throughout the world, in academics or
in the job market; and
(ix) sufficient support and guidance so that every student feels a sense of self-
worth and ability to achieve, and so that every student is encouraged to live up to
his or her full human potential.
Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-90-883-R (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993),
reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 166 (Ala. 1993).
EDUCATION RIGHTS
Some of the standards-particularly those focusing on mental health,
social ethics, cultural appreciation, and self worth3°-are probably
too difficult for the courts to apply and measure, but others could
provide substantive guidance to judges in evaluating certain types of
adequacy claims. For instance, standards requiring that schools
prepare students to compete in the job market, to vote and perform
other civic duties, and to seek higher education or advanced job
training °0 could be applied to high school graduates to determine
whether their skills and knowledge meet constitutional standards.0 9
Similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the sound basic education
required by its state constitution will provide students with at least
(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a
sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable
the student to function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient
fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and political
systems to enable the student to make informed choices with regard to issues that
affect the student personally or affect the student's community, state, and nation;
(3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully
engage in post-secondary education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient
academic and vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an equal basis
with others in further formal education or gainful employment in contemporary
society.
Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336,347,488 S.E.2d 249,255 (1997).
Two other states have used more cautious wording in defining constitutionally
required educational outcomes. The New York Court of Appeals has defined a "sound
basic education" under its constitution as consisting of "the basic literacy, calculating, and
verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic
participants capable of voting and serving on a jury" and of "minimally adequate" physical
facilities, equipment, textbooks, and teaching. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995). The South Carolina Supreme Court has defined a
"minimally adequate education" under its constitution as providing students with "safe
and adequate facilities" in which they have the opportunity to acquire communication
skills, vocational training, an unspecified level of knowledge of science and mathematics,
and a "fundamental" knowledge of economics, history, and government. Abbeville
County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535,540 (S.C. 1999).
The other states that have recognized a right to a minimum quality of education
have either adopted legislative and administrative standards to define that quality or have
not provided a definition of adequacy. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 624 So. 2d at 166 (requiring support
and guidance to provide each student with "a sense of self-worth and ability to achieve"
and to encourage them "to live up to his or her full human potential"); Rose, 790 S.W.2d
at 212 (requiring "sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness"); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877 (requiring the development of social ethics).
308. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 624 So. 2d at 166 (requiring a system
of education that will prepare students to compete in academics and the job market in
Alabama, surrounding states, and beyond); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 (requiring sufficient
academic and vocational skills to "compete favorably" in Kentucky and surrounding
states); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 666 (defining a sound basic
education as equipping New York students to vote and serve on juries).
309. To borrow a common fact pattern from early educational malpractice cases, a
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Other elements of the adequacy definitions could provide
enforceable standards if they were supplemented with standards set
by the political branches in recent education reform efforts. 10 For
instance, requirements that students be taught sufficient reading and
writing skills to function "in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization" 31' or "at the national and international levels, in the
court faced with a suit by a student who had graduated from high school despite reading at
only an elementary-school level could look at the requirements for local entry-level jobs
and for application to technical and higher education programs to determine whether the
student's skills meet constitutional standards. Compare, e.g., Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at
856 (involving a student who graduated from a California high school despite reading at a
fifth-grade level and complained that he could not compete in the job market), and
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352,1353 (N.Y. 1979) (involving
a single plaintiff whose literacy skills were so low that he could not fill out job
applications), with Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255 (defining a sound basic
education as one that prepares students to "compete on an equal basis with others in
further formal education or gainful employment"). For district-wide claims, courts could
look at how many graduates are required to take remedial courses upon entrance to
college and at whether local employers will hire them. See, e.g., Martha I. Morgan et al.,
Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The Alabama Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 559, 585-86 (1995) (discussing evidence presented in Alabama's school financing
litigation about the high percentage of students required to take college remedial courses
and about a corporation that refused to hire local graduates because of their poor skills).
Of course, applying such criteria to elementary school students would be highly
problematic because they have not yet engaged in the adult activities identified in the
adequacy definitions. One option would be simply to bar such claims and to define an
adequate education solely in terms of the outcomes that should be achieved after twelve
grades of public schooling. This approach would allow the courts to rely on the most
concrete of the judicial adequacy criteria and would reduce the risk of a flood of litigation
by limiting the pool of potential plaintiffs. Such a policy, however, would also deny relief
to students in early grades when an intervention by the courts might do the most good.
Education research shows that students who are several years behind their peers
academically by the end of elementary school are far more likely to drop out in middle
and high school. See Elson, supra note 272, at 753 (discussing the cumulative effect of
early academic failures and the risk of creating self-fulfilling prophecies in the minds of
students). Even if such students complete a high school program, it seems probable that
they may require far more remedial services as 18-year-olds than they would have needed
in order to catch up to their peers while still in elementary school. Thus, a twelve-year
standard would raise both fairness and efficiency issues. For a discussion of a way to
measure adequacy that would be more applicable to younger students, see infra notes 310-
13 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 5 (discussing complaints about American schools and a sharp rise
in the number of states using standardized testing, school report cards, and teacher pay
penalties in an effort to increase accountability). Other potential sources of
supplementary standards include state accreditation standards, which tend to be quite low,
and statutory lists of aspirational educational goals. See Dietz, supra note 23, at 1212.
311. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. Although this standard is not as explicit as the ones
focusing on students' preparation for the job market, see supra notes 308-09 and
accompanying text, it too may be intended to measure students' skills at the end of a 12-
year education. The Kentucky Supreme Court appears to have based its adequacy
definition in Rose on national performance standards for high schools published in 1918.
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coming years" '312 might be difficult for courts to apply to individual
plaintiffs because the criteria are so broad. As discussed earlier,
however, a number of states and national organizations have
developed detailed grade-by-grade benchmarks for student
achievement and standardized testing programs in an effort to hold
schools more accountable for their pupils' progress.3 13 Courts could
use these standards and test results to help assess plaintiffs' academic
progress, track their performance against other students, and
determine whether the constitutional requirements have been
satisfied.
This is not to say that standardized testing and accountability
programs are a panacea. The extent of educational reforms varies
widely from state to state.3 14 Moreover, allowing students to sue any
time they fail a state test would risk creating a flood of litigation315
See Patricia F. First & Louis F. Miron, The Social Construction of Adequacy, 20 J.L. &
EDUC. 421,437 (1991).
312. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 624 So. 2d at 166.
313. See supra notes 5, 83-85. The reform efforts were spurred by the release of A
NATION AT RISK, supra note 5, and a number of other reports in the early 1980s showing
an increase in illiteracy, declining test scores, and other educational problems. See
Liebman, supra note 131, at 371-74 (cataloging the 1980s reports and the reaction among
law- and policy-makers). As of 1999, Education Week reported that 48 states tested their
students, 40 have adopted standards in all core subjects, and 34 had gone beyond multiple-
choice tests to include "performance questions" in their assessment programs. See Quality
Counts: State of the States, supra note 5. Nevertheless, the report warned that some
accountability programs were more advanced than others, with Texas and North Carolina
having the most complete systems. See id. The federal government has also attempted to
promote educational standards through its voluntary Goals 2000 initiative. See Goals
2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)); Lisa Kelly, Yearning for Lake Wobegon:
The Quest for the Best Test at the Expense of the Best Education, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
41, 51-54 (1998) (discussing government spending under Goals 2000).
314. See supra note 313.
315. In many states, failure rates are 30% or higher. See, e.g., Norman Draper, Basic-
Skills Test Results, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 29, 1999, at Al (reporting that
70% of Minnesota eighth-graders passed state math tests and 75% passed reading exams);
Tim Simmons, Scores Show Schools Making Grade, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Aug. 6, 1999, at Al (reporting that 69% of students scored at grade-level on tests in
reading and math, up from 53% six years ago); Brian Weber et al., State Test Results
Disappoint Rome, Educators Promise Action After Disappointing Results, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Nov. 13, 1997, at. A4 (reporting that 57% of students passed
statewide reading exams and 31% writing tests). Given that many states test students on
multiple subjects every year, allowing a cause of action based on each exam could create
thousands of claims per state. Moreover, given the delays of the litigation process, courts
might not be able to adjudicate a claim and provide meaningful relief before the
commencement of the next round of testing.
Courts have several means at their disposal to make the litigation load more
manageable. One commentator, for instance, has argued that schools should be held
liable only if more than 20% of their students in any grade from two to six fall at least one
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and would raise serious legal316 and policy 317 issues. Nevertheless,
year below their grade level on basic skills tests or if more than 10% of their students fall
two years or more below grade level. See Ratner, supra note 59, at 859 (basing the
standard on results from schools in New York, Houston, and Philadelphia that have
proven most effective in educating large numbers of poor and minority students). While
this standard assumes that lawsuits would be brought on a class action basis, courts could
adopt a similar strategy in cases involving individual students by choosing a benchmark
that would allow a claim to proceed only if the plaintiff is several years behind his peers
academically. Another option that could be used alone or in conjunction with requiring a
showing of substantial educational failure would be to assess the quality of education not
on an annual basis, but rather at set intervals-such as in the fourth, eighth, and twelfth
grades-or when a student moves from one level of education to another-such as from
elementary to middle school. In addition to reducing the number of potential plaintiffs,
such a system would also allow the courts to assess several years' worth of academic
progress and to avoid making decisions based on a single test score. See infra note 316
(discussing testing accuracy issues). This option could also help to ensure that students are
prepared before they move on to the next stage of the education process.
316. Concerns about standardized tests' statistical accuracy and cultural biases, for
example, would complicate their use as evidence in a courtroom setting. For example, in
North Carolina, school officials have based their state accountability program on end-of-
grade tests that were developed originally to measure how well the state curriculum was
delivered to large groups of students rather than to assess individual students. See Kelly
Thompson & Susan Kauffman, Educators Question Dependence on State Exams: Tests
Virtually Dictate Decisions to Flunk, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jun. 25, 1995, at
Bi. As a result of their design, the tests have a relatively large margin of error. All
students are ranked on a developmental scale ranging from 100 to 200 points, so that their
scores rise about five points with each year of education. However, for a 95% confidence
level on individual students' scores, the margin of error is four to six points -potentially
an entire grade level. See id.; see also Arthur L. Coleman, Excellence and Equity in
Education: High Standards for High-Stakes Tests, 6 VA. J. SOc. POL'Y & L. 81, 102-06,
108-09 & n.81 (1998) (discussing the importance of assessing standardized tests' validity
and ensuring that tests are not used for purposes for which they were not designed); Kelly,
supra note 313, at 43-46, 54-57 (discussing flaws in various types of standardized test
formats and the tradeoffs that states have made between cost and accuracy in individual
testing results); Liebman, supra note 131, at 374-77 (cataloging legal and policy objections
to the increase in standardized testing nationwide); James P. Durling, Note, Testing the
Tests: The Due Process Implications of Minimum Competency Testing, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
577, 616-17 (1984) (discussing the frequency of scoring, coding, and computer errors as
well as structural flaws in standardized tests). But see Liebman, supra note 131, at 391
(arguing that school officials should not be able to raise testing accuracy concerns to the
extent that legislators have validated those tests for measuring student performance).
317. Standardized testing critics argue it is only fair to hold school officials accountable
by the same measures that they are using to determine graduation, state takeovers, and
teacher pay. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 45, at 60-65 (arguing that states using
outcomes measurements to make decisions about promotion to higher grades and
graduation are legally "responsible for providing students with the means to pass");
Liebman, supra note 131, at 377 (arguing that poor and minority communities can either
mobilize against the educational standards movement because it is often used to exclude
poor and minority children from programs or attempt to enforce educational standards on
behalf of those children); cf. Nicole Bondi, Pressure Mounts to Raise Scores on State
School Tests, DET. NEWS, Jan. 27, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 3914093 (discussing
increasing stakes in standardized testing); Jolayne Houtz, State to Put Schools Themselves
to the Test-Cash or Shutdown? Accountability Will Tell, SEATTLE TIMES, July 6, 1998, at
EDUCATION RIGHTS
state accountability programs clearly give courts a tool for defining
educational adequacy and measuring student achievement that the
early educational malpractice courts did not have.318 As judges and
commentators have noted, adopting these accountability standards
has an added benefit in that they enhance courts' legitimacy because
the benchmarks have been set by the political branches and are not
simply a subjective value judgment. 19 Thus, it may be possible for
courts to use the standards developed in the school financing cases
and in educational accountability programs to restrict the flow of
litigation, while still allowing plaintiffs who have experienced extreme
academic failures to proceed to the next step of the analysis.32
Al, available in 1998 WL 3160931 (same); Jack Sullivan, True Test: Ready or Not,
Students Face Tough Test, BOSTON HERALD, May 3, 1998, at A16, available in 1998 WL
7344220 (same); supra note 5 (same). Nevertheless, deciding individual lawsuits based
solely on standardized testing and benchmarks from state accountability programs could
have a detrimental effect on political efforts to reform education. The risk of litigation
could create a disincentive for elected leaders to keep pushing for additional educational
reforms and higher standards. But see Dietz, supra note 23, at 1218-19 n.188
(acknowledging that allowing the political branches to define their own constitutional
duties is a "weak point" of adopting legislative and administrative standards to measure
constitutional adequacy, but expressing hope that political pressure would prevent the
lowering of academic standards).
On a more philosophical level, holding schools liable in court based solely on
students' test performance might significantly increase the already substantial pressure to
"teach to the test" rather than to provide a comprehensive curriculum that prepares
students to function in a larger society. See, e.g., Bondi, supra, at Al (reporting that
Michigan schools spend more than two months per year preparing for a battery of
statewide tests and that some teachers suspend regular homework and class assignments in
order to concentrate on test materials); Tim Simmons, Schools Find Value, Vexation in
ABCs Program, NEwS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 26, 1997, at Al (reporting
concerns from teachers that academic subjects that are not included in North Carolina's
testing program will begin to receive less emphasis in classrooms); see also Abby
Goodnough, Investigator Says Teachers in City Aided in Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1999, at Al (reporting charges that two principals and 43 of teachers in New York City
schools had helped students cheat on standardized tests in order to improve their schools'
results). Such a result seems inconsistent with the spirit of the education adequacy cases'
focus on preparing students to function as workers, learners, and citizens. See supra notes
86-89, 305-09 and accompanying text (discussing the standards set in the school financing
cases recognizing a right to an adequate education).
318. The educational malpractice litigation began in the mid-1970s, approximately 10
years before states began to implement standards-based reforms. See supra notes 4-5. By
the mid-1980s, precedents rejecting malpractice theories were firmly established in New
York, California, and several other states. See iL
319. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
320. See, e.g., supra note 315 (discussing a fact pattern presented in an earlier
educational malpractice case that could be evaluated under standards requiring that
students be prepared to compete in the job market and advanced education); cf Enrich,
supra note 10, at 173 (noting in the school financing context that conditions in some
schools are so poor that courts can find a violation of the state's duty without the need "to
articulate or apply a determinate standard of adequacy").
2000]
466 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78
2. Establishing Causation and Fault
Once a court has determined that a plaintiff's skills and academic
knowledge do not meet constitutional standards, causation would
become a critical issue. After all, the fact that a student does not pass
a standardized test or is unprepared to compete in the workplace may
not be due to school officials' actions, but rather to the student's
intellectual ability, lack of self-discipline, lack of parental support, or
other social or environmental factors.321  Particularly in cases
involving a single student who has fallen several years behind other
classmates in the same educational program, courts have struggled
with how to determine causation and fault.3"
In building upon the school financing precedents, courts'
analyses of adequacy claims would almost certainly have to shift from
educational outcomes to educational inputs-such as curriculum,
321. The educational malpractice cases emphasized this point repeatedly to distinguish
teaching from practicing medicine and other professions. See Ross v. Creighton, 740 F.
Supp. 1319,1328 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Without effort by a student, he cannot be educated....
In other professions, by contrast, client cooperation is far less important; given a modicum
of cooperation, a competent professional in other fields can control the results
obtained."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Peter
W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
("[T]he achievement of literacy in the schools, or its failure, are influenced by a host of
factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and
beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physical, neurological, emotional,
cultural, [or] environmental .... "); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (N.Y. 1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring) ("Factors such as the student's
attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience and home environment may all play
an essential and immeasurable role in learning."). But see Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges
Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality, Status, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help
from Ordinary Citizens), 80 MARO. L. REv. 1, 31-34 (1996) (concluding that educational
malpractice cases have improperly blamed plaintiffs and their cultural backgrounds for
their lack of academic skills).
322. See, e.g., Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (involving a single plaintiff who had
graduated from high school even though he could read at only a fifth-grade level);
Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353 (involving a single plaintiff whose literacy skills were so low
that he could not fill out job applications); Eschweiler, supra note 131, at 109 (noting that
judges often feel uncomfortable holding educators responsible when one student
graduates without being able to read while those who sat next to her in class received an
adequate education). This is not to say that causation would be impossible to prove in all
cases, however. When school officials have misdiagnosed students' disabilities and placed
them in inappropriate education programs, for instance, plaintiffs could show that they
had no access to the curriculum needed for them to gain constitutionally required skills
and knowledge. See Aquila, supra note 131, at 331, 345-51 (arguing that cases special
education cases do not present the same concerns about establishing duty, manageable
standards, and causation as general inadequacy claims); see also Hoffman v. Board of
Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 318-19 (N.Y. 1979) (involving a speech-impaired student who was
misdiagnosed and placed in a classroom for students with mental handicaps for 13 years);
supra note 8 (citing misdiagnosis and misplacement cases from other jurisdictions).
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teacher-student ratios, remediation programs, and other resources-
in order to determine whether the defendants had fulfilled their
constitutional duty to provide an adequate education program or
whether their breach of duty caused the plaintiff's poor academic
performance.31 Given the affirmative nature of the constitutional
obligation,32 4 an argument can be made for shifting the burden of
proof as well as the focus of the analysis.3' School officials not only
have a duty to provide adequate educational services, but also have
greater expertise in analyzing academic problems and access to
information about their own educational programs than does any
potential plaintiff. Thus, it may make sense to require the defendants
to counter the plaintiff's charges of inadequacy by showing that they
had used reasonable means of providing an adequate education or
had complied with other constitutional requirements.326 The burden
323. Much as they can in measuring educational outputs, courts may be able to
enhance their legitimacy by measuring inputs based on standards set by the other
branches. See Morgan et al., supra note 309, at 568-571, 589-90 (discussing how the
Alabama school financing case used standards from state statutes and regulations to
evaluate school facilities, curriculum, supplies, staff ratios, and other inputs). However,
because the other branches may set their standards based on the availability of funds
rather than on an independent judgment of what inputs are required to provide an
adequate education, some commentators have cautioned against undue judicial deference.
See iU. at 591-92 (advocating using national input standards as a supplement to avoid this
problem); id. at 547-81 (discussing evidence presented in the Alabama school financing
litigation comparing input levels to standards set by federal statutes, private accreditation
organizations, expert testimony, and other non-state sources).
324. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the unique and affirmative nature of the
adequacy right recognized in the school financing cases).
325. Cf Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1288-89 (applying a burden-shifting scheme to
analyze infringements on students' fundamental right to education); Horton v. Meskill
("Horton III"), 486 A.2d 1099, 1105-06 (Conn. 1985) (same); Hershkoff, supra note 136,
at 1137-38 (suggesting that the government should bear the burden of proof under the
rational relation analysis in positive rights cases); Liebman, supra note 131, at 391 (arguing
that the adoption of educational accountability standards that assume all students can
achieve specified outcomes creates a reasonable presumption against state officials
"whenever many or most of the students in a school or district are initially, or at least
successively, unable to achieve state-mandated benchmarks on state-mandated exams").
326. The reasonable means standard is derived from the "affirmative rational relation"
test discussed in Part III. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. If a court
adopted an interest-balancing test, in contrast, the defendants might attempt to show that
their interests outweigh those of the plaintiffs or that they had provided educational
services up to the point that would create an undue burden on the government. See supra
notes 226-28 and accompanying text. Constitutional tort claims, see supra Part III.B, do
not have a formulaic analysis, but it seems unlikely that courts would apply something
more rigorous than a reasonable efforts standard. Cf. supra notes 208-16 (discussing why
requiring narrowly tailored means instead of reasonable means would be inappropriate in
the context of substantive due process and equal protection analysis).
The educational malpractice cases suggest that schools should also be able to
defend themselves by offering evidence that students' home environments or other
2000]
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could then shift back to the plaintiff to provide further evidence of
causation or to prove that the defendants had a constitutional duty to
take steps to ensure that outside problems did not interfere with the
student's education.32 7
Even if a court found the burden-shifting argument
unpersuasive, educational malpractice commentators have suggested
other steps that might make the causation issue more manageable.
For example, some commentators have argued that an analysis
focusing on whether school officials' behavior was a "substantial
factor" in a student's poor academic performance is a more
appropriate test for determining complex student achievement issues
than traditional "but for" causation analyses 3u Courts could also
draw upon expert witnesses, statutory and regulatory education
provisions, and various types of circumstantial evidence to
supplement a common-sense determination of cause and effect.329
outside causes are responsible for poor academic performance. See supra note 322.
However, in the context of a constitutional requirement that state government provide
students with an adequate education, it is not clear that the presence of outside factors
should excuse defendants from having to show that their educational programs are
generally adequate. The school financing cases that recognized a right to an adequate
education did not condition that right-or state officials' corresponding duty-on the
individual characteristics of students. Thus, the precedents do not suggest that states owe
any less of a duty to provide adequate educational inputs to a student who is undisciplined
than to one who is self-motivated. While educational obstacles that are not of the schools'
making clearly would be relevant to determining why plaintiffs did not meet constitutional
performance standards, the presence of such factors alone arguably are not a complete
defense for state officials.
327. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (requiring state
officials to take affirmative steps to prevent infringements upon students' fundamental
right to education when local mismanagement threatened to end school six weeks early);
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1270 (requiring state officials to take affirmative steps to prevent
infringements upon students' fundamental right to education when changing demographic
patterns had created racial and ethnic segregation); Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County
Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 916 (W. Va. 1996) (requiring school officials to take
affirmative steps to prevent infringements upon students' fundamental right to education
even when the students had been suspended for misconduct); see also supra Part III.A.2
(discussing these cases).
328. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 59, at 856-57; Wade, supra note 321, at 31 n. 127; Joan
Blackburn, Note, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FoRDHAM URB.
L. 117, 131-32 (1978). A "but for" analysis concludes that the defendant's conduct is the
cause of an event only if the event would not have occurred without the conduct, while
"substantial factor" analysis finds causation when the conduct was a substantial factor
leading to the event. See, e.g., Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d
731, 732-34 (Tex. 1952). Advocates argue that the "substantial factor" analysis is
preferable in education cases because it does not require the courts to determine the
precise relationship between multiple factors affecting student achievement and because it
avoids excusing schools from liability simply because other causes have contributed to the
result. See Wade, supra note 321, at 31 n.127; Blackburn, supra, at 131-32.
329. See Elson, supra note 272, at 746-50 (suggesting that circumstantial evidence
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No matter what measures courts adopt, causation is likely to
remain a major hurdle in adequacy cases. However, the fact that
many plaintiffs may be unable to establish causation does not
necessarily suggest that courts should bar such claims entirely.
Instead, the difficulty of causation issues could allow courts to
develop adequacy case law slowly, starting with only clear-cut cases.3 0
B. Remedies
The issue of what remedies to provide for violations of the right
to an adequate education is both an important issue in its own right
and a major factor in determining the amount of adequacy litigation.
As discussed in Part III, there are very strong policy reasons for
denying plaintiffs the right to recover monetary damages for
adequacy claims: such damages would not only take money away
from schools that are already providing an inadequate education, but
also would greatly enhance the attractiveness of education lawsuits to
potential plaintiffs.33' While damages awards would allow families to
choose among public and private tutoring programs and would help
to deter educator misconduct, on balance it seems unlikely that courts
would be willing to provide monetary relief.3 32
Thus, injunctive relief ordering tutoring programs or other
remedial measures appears to be the most practical remedy in
education cases. Such measures would be less expensive than
monetary damages and would allow courts to address educational
harms directly without having to speculate regarding proper
compensation for poor academic skills.333 Courts could use the
procedures developed in desegregation cases, requiring the parties to
submit plans for relief and using expert testimony to help evaluate the
reasonableness of the proposals.3 4 Even if a court did not adopt a
would include contrasting students' previous academic history to their current
performance and looking at results from other classrooms or groups of students who are
similar demographically to the plaintiffs); supra note 323.
330. Cf Elson, supra note 272, at 750 (concluding that proving causation in educational
malpractice cases will be considerably more difficult than in most physical negligence
cases, but is "not so inherently speculative" as to require automatic dismissal).
331. See supra notes 273,291-94 and accompanying text.
332. See id.
333. See Elson, supra note 272, at 762-63.
334. See Ratner, supra note 59, at 859-60; see also Liebman, supra note 131, at 394
(suggesting that ordering desegregation would be an appropriate remedy in some
inadequacy cases). For cases involving individual plaintiffs rather than a large class action,
the remediation plans might look something like the "individual education programs"
(IEPs) used in the special education context. IEPs are developed by a committee of
teachers and other school professionals in conjunction with parents to plan the education
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balancing test to determine whether the defendants had fulfilled their
constitutional duty, such a test could help determine at this stage of
analysis whether the proposed remedies would create an undue
burden on any of the parties. 35
If courts are wary of ordering complex institutional reform
measures that may interfere with daily school operations and the
separation of powers,336 some commentators have suggested that
providing vouchers to allow plaintiffs to attend schools of their
choosing would be a more straightforward remedy.33 Vouchers
program for each special education student and are updated periodically as the student
ages. See generally Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case
Against "Inclusion," 72 WASH. L. REV. 775, 785-90 (1997) (discussing the use and
development of IEPs within the framework of federal special education law). Courts may
want to avoid the paperwork and procedural burdens of the special education system, but
the general idea of an individualized plan that is monitored and updated periodically
might help provide relief for individual students.
335. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
336. Although court-ordered institutional reforms have become increasingly common
particularly at the federal level, scholars have hotly debated whether courts are competent
to make such broad bureaucratic reforms and whether such measures are consistent with
separation of powers and federalism. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term, Foreword. The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979); William A.
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy,
91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv.
L. REV. 353 (1978); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 949 (1978). In the education arena, Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.
Mo. 1985), affd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), is often held up as an example of judicial
interference with the other branches of government. The federal courts have ordered
more than $1 billion in additional spending, supervised the construction of new school
facilities, and overseen the rewriting of curriculum in an attempt to desegregate the
Kansas City schools, but have made little progress in improving integration or student
achievement. See Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, or
School Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1105-08, 1113-18
(1996) (tracing the history of the "epic lawsuit" and the difficulties courts have faced in
achieving lasting results); John Choon Yoh, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The
Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1125-27, 1138-
39, 1172-74 (1996) (same); Andres, supra note 95, at 812 (same); Deborah E. Beck, Note,
Jenkins v. Missouri. School Choice as a Method for Desegregating an Inner-City School
District, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1033-38 (1993) (same).
337. See, e.g., Andres, supra note 95, at 808 (arguing that although vouchers are often
perceived as an "innovative and aggressive solution, they are actually in many ways the
least intrusive alternative available to remedy the deprivation of education rights"); cf
Ramsdell v. North River Sch. Dist. No. 200, 704 P.2d 606, 609 (Wash. 1985) (en banc)
(involving plaintiffs who sought release from their local schools based on adequacy
theories so that their children could attend public schools in a neighboring district); supra
notes 98-101 (discussing the Ramsdell case). See generally CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN
SCHOOL CHOICE 7-170 (Margaret D. Tannebaum ed., 1995) (presenting historical
background on the vouchers movement and arguments for and against voucher
proposals); Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the
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would offer many of the advantages of monetary damages by allowing
families to choose remedial programs for themselves, giving
educators an incentive to provide better education to avoid losing
students to private or other public schools, and helping courts to
avoid supervising complex educational reforms 8  However, there
would be tradeoffs. Schools would not have to pay compensatory or
punitive damages, but still would lose a significant amount of funding
per plaintiff-a loss that critics worry would undermine already shaky
education programs.339 Moreover, it seems likely that the availability
Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, passim (1993)
(discussing legal issues involved in voucher programs and providing a state-by-state survey
of school choice initiatives). A discussion of the constitutional issues involved in providing
vouchers to religious schools is beyond the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., Daniel,
supra, at 57-69; Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62
U. CIN. L. REV. 37,passim (1993); Beck, supra note 336, at 1051-54.
Other commentators have suggested that ordering state or local city officials to
take over inadequate school districts would provide many of the same benefits as vouchers
by deterring misconduct and allowing courts to provide meaningful relief without
entangling themselves in dally school operations. See Aaron Saiger, Note, Disestablishing
Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830,
1842-43, 1853-70 (1999) (noting that school choice has generally not been thought of as a
judicial remedy and arguing that disestablishing local districts is less disruptive and is
already provided for in many state statutes); see also Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243
(Cal. 1992) (ordering the state to take over a local school system temporarily to ensure
that students could attend classes through the end of the regular academic year).
338. See Andres, supra note 95, at 808-15; cf. Elson, supra note 272, at 761 (discussing
similar advantages for monetary damages).
339. See, e.g., Andrew B. Sandier & David E. Kapel, Educational Vouchers: A Viable
Option for Urban Settings?, in CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note
337, at 119, 124-25, 132-34 (arguing that public schools' costs would not be reduced
"dollar for dollar" by reductions in enrollment); Green, supra note 337, at 39 (predicting
that voucher programs would impoverish public schools and create a two-tier system of
education). But see Jerome J. Hanus, An Argument in Favor of School Vouchers, in
JEROME J. HANUS & PETER W. COOKSON, JR., CHOOSING SCHOOLS: VOUCHERS AND
AMERICAN EDUCATION 1, 59-62 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1996) (arguing that voucher systems
would provide the government with a subsidy because nonpublic schools are more cost
effective than public programs); Andres, supra note 95, at 814 (arguing that funding for
public schools could improve if voucher recipients receive only actual tuition costs because
many private schools cost less than public school per-pupil allocations). Part of the
difficulty in estimating the financial impact of vouchers is that simply comparing the
operating costs of public and private schools does not account for the costs of
administering a voucher program. See Peter W. Cookson, Jr., There Is No Escape Clause
in the Social Contract: The Case Against School Vouchers, in HANUS & COOKSON, supra,
at 111, 160-61 (arguing that voucher plans must provide transportation and extensive
information about academic programs to allow poor families equal educational choice, but
that doing so on a large scale would be extremely expensive); Sandler & Kapel, supra, at
132-34 (discussing the "hidden costs" of transportation and administration); see also supra
note 341 (discussing the bureaucracy needed to run large voucher programs).
One commentator has suggested that damage to public schools by school choice
programs could itself provide a basis for constitutional adequacy claims by public school
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of vouchers as a remedy might encourage more families to file suit,
thereby increasing the amount of educational adequacy litigation and
raising fears about judicial manageability. 40 Implementing a large-
scale voucher program also could require creating a significant new
bureaucracy, which in turn could raise questions about courts' ability
and authority to supervise institutional reforms.3 1
Given the high level of controversy over vouchers, the concerns
about their implementation, and the risk of increasing litigation,
courts should be cautious in adopting such a remedy in educational
adequacy cases. Although advocates claim that voucher systems can
reform American education and increase the quality of public
schools, such assertions are fiercely debated and evidence is mixed? 4
Even if vouchers are not appropriate as a means of court-ordered
institutional reform, however, there may be a separate question as to
whether vouchers are the best remedy in isolated cases. In situations
students. See Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional
Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2002,2003,2013-19 (1996).
340. Cf. supra notes 301-03 (discussing manageability concerns).
341. Cf CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL
CHOICE: A SPECIAL REPORT 23-25, 27-28 (1992) (reporting that school choice programs
require significant administrative, financial, and transportation support and are most
successful when implemented gradually and voluntarily by local schools); Cookson, supra
note 339, at 157, 160-61 (arguing that most voucher plans are "bureaucratic nightmares
waiting to be born," requiring expensive transportation and information networks to be
effective and equitable); Sandler & Kapel, supra note 339, at 132-34 (discussing the need
for a new bureaucracy to supervise a proposed statewide voucher program in Louisiana);
supra note 336 (discussing criticism of court-mandated institutional reforms).
342. Compare, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 214, 217 (1990) (reporting evidence that private schools produce
greater academic gains that public schools and calling vouchers and school choice a
"panacea" for educational reform), Hanus, supra note 339, at 53-55 (arguing that there is
significant evidence suggesting that private schools would improve student achievement),
and Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 47, 67-74
(1998) (discussing evidence that indicating school choice programs and private schools
increase student achievement without balkanizing students), with CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 341, at 20-23, 25-26 (reporting evidence
that statewide choice programs tend to widen the gaps between rich and poor districts
without improving student achievement), Cookson, supra note 339, at 157-60
(summarizing studies from other countries indicating that vouchers lead to greater social
stratification and may "intellectually impoverish" schools in low-income neighborhoods),
Richard F. Elmore & Bruce Fuller, Empirical Research on Educational Choice: What Are
the Implications for Policy-Makers?, in WHO CHOOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE,
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 187, 189-95 (Bruce
Fuller & Richard F. Elmore eds., 1996) (reporting that school choice programs appear to
stratify students by social class and ethnicity even when designed to create equity and that
they improve student achievement only when coupled with strong educational
improvement measures), and Daniel, supra note 337, at 27 (arguing that "[w]here
inadequate education exists, the state's duty is to improve rather than abandon").
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when school officials prove unable or unwilling to correct
constitutional deficiencies over an extended period of time, for
instance, courts might want to reserve vouchers as a remedy of last
resort rather than to force plaintiffs to wait additional years for
institutional improvements. 31
C. Other Ways to Limit Adequacy Claims
If courts determine that the methods outlined above are not
sufficient to address judicial manageability, they could narrow the
scope of the constitutional duty to provide an adequate education.'
The wording of some states' constitutional provisions may support
restricting the school financing precedents recognizing adequacy
rights to authorize suits only against state legislators for decisions
about the statewide funding of education.'S However, such a result
seems inconsistent with the language of other states' constitutions346
and of the court decisions recognizing a right to an adequate
education.347
As noted previously, the school financing cases that provide
detailed definitions of adequacy speak in broad terms of a right to a
certain level of education rather than a right just to a certain level of
funding.m This distinction is illustrated most clearly in the Rose
343. Cf. Beck, supra note 336, at 1046, 1056 (arguing that vouchers would be an
appropriate remedy in the Jenkins case because eight years of court-ordered
desegregation efforts had provided little relief for students); Dominick Cirelli, Jr.,
Comment, Utilizing School Voucher Programs to Remedy School Financing Problems, 30
AKRON L. REv. 469, 500 (1997) (arguing that vouchers cannot solve systemic problems in
school financing but may be a stronger solution on a "small scale" for students in weak
school systems).
344. Cf supra notes 301-02 (discussing the educational malpractice courts' refusal to
recognize a duty to provide an adequate education as a response to concerns about the
judicial manageability of such claims).
345. See, e.g., KANS. CONST. art. 6, § 6(b) ("The legislature shall make suitable
provision for finance of the educational interests of the state."). For analyses of state
constitutional language, see McUsic, supra note 29, at 309 & n.4, 319-26, 333-39; Ratner,
supra note 59, at 814-16; Thro, supra note 23, at 243-46 & nn.130-41. For a list of the
provisions, see supra note 47.
346. Many states constitutions' education provisions do not simply require that state
officials provide education funding, but instead require a system of schools meeting
constitutional standards or otherwise require the pursuit of substantive academic
standards. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The General Assembly ... shall by Law
establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools
."); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall provide for a system of
free public elementary and secondary schools ... and shall seek to ensure that an
educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained.").
347. See supra notes 64-93,306-12 (discussing and quoting the cases at length).
348. See id.
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decision, which struck down not just Kentucky's method of financing
schools but its entire system of educational bureaucracy. 349 The
school financing courts' use of outcomes-based measures to define an
adequate education also suggests that the constitutional requirements
encompass more than simply a given level of financial inputs.35 The
school financing precedents and subsequent cases adjudicating
education rights suggest that plaintiffs should be able to seek relief
for systemic flaws in educational services-whether those flaws are
caused by state legislators, education administrators, or local school
district officials.3 51  Although the need for judicially manageable
standards is powerful, the evolution of the case law to date and the
management methods discussed in this Part suggest that courts may
be able to manage a case-by-case development of adequacy law.352 At
the very least, the strong language in the school financing cases and
courts' traditional role as protectors of constitutional rights suggest
that courts should weigh matters carefully before categorically
denying plaintiffs redress for violations of the constitutional right to
an adequate education.
349. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,215 (Ky. 1989); supra notes
76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion).
350. See supra notes 64-93, 306-12 (discussing the cases and their emphasis on
educational outcomes).
351. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (requiring state
officials to take affirmative steps to prevent infringements upon students' fundamental
right to education caused by local mismanagement); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270
(Conn. 1996) (requiring state officials to take affirmative steps to prevent infringements
upon students' fundamental right to education caused by housing patterns and other social
factors); Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 916 (W. Va.
1996) (requiring local school districts to take affirmative steps to prevent infringements
upon students' fundamental right to education even when the students had been
suspended for misconduct); see also Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont II"),
703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (stating in a school financing case recognizing a
fundamental right to an adequate education that strict scrutiny should be used to examine
any government action and inaction causing "an individual school or school district [to]
offer[] something less than educational adequacy"); see also Saiger, supra note 337, at 1854
(arguing that courts have the authority to order remedies where state officials have
"delegated [their] own constitutional responsibilities to demonstrably incompetent agents
with no independent constitutional status").
352. Washington courts, for instance, do not appear to have been inundated with
adequacy claims despite the fact that they have left the door open to individual lawsuits by
students who believe they have been deprived of their constitutional right to education.
See supra notes 98-106 (discussing Washington cases). California and Connecticut courts
have also been able to distinguish their precedents allowing relief to students in school
districts with severe financial and segregation problems from cases brought by individual
students seeking to overturn class grades, to recognize entitlements to individualized
education programs, and to claim a right to participate in interscholastic athletics. See




Given state courts' historical aversion to educational malpractice
claims,353 they almost certainly will be reluctant to apply students'
newly recognized education rights beyond the school financing
context.M In addition to concerns about courts' ability to define
educational adequacy, determine causation, and deal with the
potential impact of individual damages claims,355 the affirmative
nature of the right to an adequate education makes it difficult to
apply traditional constitutional analyses. 6 While it may be possible
to develop new analytical models that are more sensitive to the
nature of positive rights,357 the temptation to try to redefine students'
educational rights in more narrow terms or to create other obstacles
to constitutional suits will be powerful.358
Yet, as state courts have recognized in dealing with the school
financing cases, their role in protecting individual constitutional rights
sometimes supersedes their traditional deference to the political
branches in policy matters.359  Even when there are no existing
remedies for constitutional violations, state courts have ample
authority-perhaps even a duty-to provide relief.36  Traditional
constitutional analysis indicates that this duty is particularly strong in
protecting against infringements upon fundament'al rights.36' Even if
the traditional formulation of fundamental rights scrutiny is
inappropriate in the educational context, categorically denying
students access to the courts for relief of violations of a fundamental
right to an adequate education appears deeply at odds with
353. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
354. Cf supra Part II (discussing early attempts to bring individual claims based on the
right to an adequate education first recognized in school financing cases).
355. See supra notes 285-310 and accompanying text.
356. See supra Part III.A.
357. See supra Part II.A.3.
358. See supra Part II and notes 217-25 and accompanying text (discussing courts'
rejections of individual adequacy claims and attempts to recast positive rights in negative
terms).
359. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989)
("This duty must be exercised even ... when the court's view of the constitution is
contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the public."); Seattle School Dist. No. 1
v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 87 n.7 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) ("The power of the judiciary to
enforce rights recognized by the constitution, even in the absence of implementing
legislation, is clear."); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264 (Wyo.
1995) ("When the legislature's transgression is a failure to act, our duty to protect
individual rights includes compelling legislative action required by the constitution."); see
also supra note 292 (citing courts who used similar language in constitutional tort cases).
360. See supra notes 292,317.
361. See supra Part III.A.
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traditional constitutional analysis.362
As state courts struggle to resolve this dilemma in coming years,
constitutional theorists will watch closely. By recognizing a positive
right to an adequate education, state judges have begun to explore an
area of constitutional law-positive rights-that has been debated for
decades without ever being put into practice on a large scale.363 In
this area, at least, state courts have stepped out of the federal
shadow.3 4 Their decisions defining the scope of the right to a certain
quality of public service will guide the way for future generations of
jurists, plaintiffs, and scholars.
KELLY THOMPSON COCHRAN
362. Cf. supra note 144 (noting that even under federal fundamental rights analysis,
cases allowing infringements upon fundamental rights are rare).
363. See Part III.A (discussing positive rights).
364. See supra notes 135-43, 197-99 and accompanying text.
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